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INTRODUCTION
Accounts of the role and influence of feminism in international
law and global governance from the 1990s onward have tended to
vacillate between analyses of the marginalization of feminist
perspectives1 and the narrative of “governance feminism,”2 the idea
* Associate Professor of Clinical Law, Duke University School of Law. I am very
grateful for the comments of Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Simon Thomas, and Katharine Young, and
to Daria Anichkova, Eleni Bakst, and Yvonne Wang for outstanding research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International
Law through the UN Security Council, 32 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 97, 97–100, 118–21 (2010)
[hereinafter Power and Danger] (noting that a common approach in many feminist analyses of
international law and its institutions is to “tell a saga of ‘marginalisation’, ‘silencing’, and
‘talking to ourselves’”).
2. See Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary
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that feminists and feminisms are wielding significant power in
various areas of international law and institutional practice with a
series of negative results.3 Such accounts have variously analyzed
watershed moments in international law’s guarantees of women’s
rights, such as protecting women in conflict, new anti-trafficking
frameworks, and gender-sensitive developments in international
criminal law, all of which occurred either just before or in the
aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. The coincidence of
this timing is particularly striking, yet the impact of a newly-changed
and increasingly omnipotent national security environment4 on
international law and institutions on women’s rights is remarkably
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 340 (2006) (“G[overnance]
F[eminism] is, I think, an under-recognized but important fact of governance more generally in
the early twenty-first century. I mean the term to refer to the incremental but by now quite
noticeable installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power. It
takes many forms, and some parts of feminism participate more effectively than others; some
are not players at all. Feminists by no means have won everything they want—far from it—but
neither are they helpless outsiders.”); see also JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND
WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006) [hereinafter SPLIT DECISIONS] (providing an
account of the power of feminism in the United States and globally); Janet Halley, Rape at
Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive
International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2008–2009) [hereinafter Rape at Rome]
(addressing the role of organized feminism in the development of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(“ICTR”), and the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) during the 1990s).
3. See, e.g., SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 31–35 (arguing feminism’s “bad faith” in
refusing to acknowledge its investment in wielding power); Halley et al., supra note 2, at 341
(describing the “successes” of “governance feminism” as embodying “very state-centered, topdown, sovereigntist feminist rule preferences”).
4. This Article addresses not only the immediate upswing in national security activities
and architecture in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, but is particularly concerned with the
evolving and broadening national security frameworks that accompanied the adoption of the
United Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006 and onwards. See G.A. Res.
60/288, at 1 (Sept. 20, 2006) (defining terrorism as “one of the most serious threats to
international peace and security. . . .”); see also the Strategy’s review resolutions: G.A. Res.
68/276 (June 24, 2014); G.A. Res. 66/282 (July 12, 2012); G.A. Res. 64/297 (Oct. 13, 2010);
G.A. Res. 62/272 (Sept. 15, 2008). For the acknowledgement in feminist legal scholarship of
the prevalence of counter-terrorism discourse and practice in national and global contexts, see,
e.g., GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVES (Margaret L. Satterthwaite & Jayne C. Huckerby eds., 2013) [hereinafter
GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES];
Vasuki Nesiah, Feminism as Counter-Terrorism: The Seduction of Power, in GENDER
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, at 127,
128 [hereinafter Feminism as Counter-Terrorism] (“The political and military scripts of
counter-terrorism have dominated the world stage in the post-9/11 era.”); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin,
Situating Women in Counterterrorism Discourses: Undulating Masculinities and Luminal
Femininities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2013) (“The events of September 11, 2001, brought
a new urgency and vibrancy to state action in the realm of counterterrorism. . . .”).
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under-theorized in existing feminist approaches to international law
and human rights.5 While there have been some feminist legal
analyses of States’ national security responses, these tend to cluster
around 9/11 and its immediate aftermath, analyzing “hard security” 6
actions such as the conflicts of Afghanistan and Iraq,7 and telling a
5. See, e.g., Jayne C. Huckerby & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Introduction, in GENDER,
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 4, at 1 (citations omitted) (“It is accepted feminist knowledge that the ‘War on Terror’
abounds with gendered narratives, illustrated, for example, in the post-9/11 era with the U.S.
government and its allies launching a war in Afghanistan in part to ‘save’ Afghan women.
However, the gender and human rights dimensions and impacts of counter-terrorism measures
outside of this moment are largely undocumented and under-theorized.”); Ní Aoláin, supra
note 4, at 1085 (citing another source) (“From a feminist perspective, it is notable that
terrorism and counterterrorism have long been of marginal interest to mainstream feminist
legal theorizing.”).
6. Such “hard” security measures for the pursuit and apprehension of terrorists were the
predominant focus of States in the aftermath of 9/11. See, e.g., UN Secretary-General,
Activities of the United Nations System in Implementing the United Nations Global CounterTerrorism Strategy, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/68/841 (Apr. 14, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/68/841] (“While initially many Member States may have focused on their immediate need
to combat and prevent terrorism by building critical capacities in law enforcement,
investigation and prosecution. . . .”); see also Isaac Kfir, Security, Gender and Post-Conflict
Reconstruction: The Need for A “Woman Question” When Engaging in Reconstruction, 22
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 71, 84–87 (2012) (noting the rise of military security and militarization
within the concept of “national security” in the post-World War II period).
7. For feminist legal analyses of international law and the events of 9/11 and their
aftermath, see generally Dianne Otto, Remapping Crisis through a Feminist Lens, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND
COMPLIANCE 75, 78 (Sari Kouvo & Zoe Pearson eds., 2010) (outlining ways in which a “turn
to crisis governance,” particularly with respect to 9/11, affects feminist engagements with
international law); Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Editorial Comment, Sex, Gender,
and September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 600 (2002) (pointing to the absence of women’s voices
in the events of 9/11 and their responses); Gina Heathcote, Feminist Reflections on the “End”
of the War on Terror, 11 MELB. J. INT’L L. 277, 278, 296 (2010) (stressing that “international
legal developments that acknowledged the relevance of feminist approaches and women’s
participation during the 1990s were either sidelined by the global war against terrorism
narrative or developed through the production of restrictive categories of female victim-status”
and “[a]n important legacy of the ‘War on Terror’ is the affirmation of a gendered
international law and a continuation of a model of international relations ignorant of its
gendered underpinnings”); Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Unlikely Bedfellows: Feminist Theory
and the War on Terror, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2009) (tracing the confluence
between feminist theory that seeks accountability for the actions of private individuals and the
legal response to terrorism); Ratna Kapur, Un-Veiling Women’s Rights in the ‘War on
Terrorism,’ 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 211 (2002) (tracing the invocation of women’s
rights in Afghanistan as a justification for military intervention and its impacts); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Women’s September 11th: Rethinking the International Law of Conflict, 47
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2006) (identifying parallels between the actors and events of 9/11 and
violence against women to highlight the asymmetry in the international community’s
responses to each as further evidence of international law’s gender bias); Feminism as
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story that is largely one of marginalization and militarization. Such
accounts have not, with some limited exceptions, taken a long view
on the aftermath of 9/11 nor kept apace with the more holistic
approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism that
represent contemporary national security practice.8 Accounts of
Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4 (analyzing the overlap of the women, peace, and security,
and national security agendas); Rachel Saloom, A Feminist Inquiry into International Law and
International Relations, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 159, 172 (2006) (“Most securitybased theories of international law and international relations are gender blind. Specifically,
gender is not taken into account when theorizing about security or about international law or
international affairs in general.”); JAYNE HUCKERBY & LAMA FAKIH, CTR. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GLOB. JUSTICE, A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM
(2011),
http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/locatinggender.pdf
[hereinafter A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM] (analyzing
the gender dimensions and gender impacts of US counter-terrorism policy from 2001 onward).
For gender analysis of the differential impacts of post-9/11 measures on Muslim women as
compared to Muslim men in the United States context, see Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive
Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim Women’s Identity Performance in the Workplace, 20
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 9 (2014) (addressing how stereotypes of Muslim women, including “as
terrorists, violent, and disloyal” affect their experience in the workplace); Sahar F. Aziz, From
the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of
Intersectionality, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 191, 195 (2012) (“Notwithstanding that
the headscarved woman equally bears the brunt of the government’s harsh counterterrorism
tactics and the public’s distrust of Muslims, her voice and perspectives are notably absent from
the discourse”); Nadine Strossen, Freedom and Fear Post-9/11: Are We Again Fearing
Witches and Burning Women?, 31 NOVA L. REV. 279 (2007) (detailing adverse post-9/11
impacts on women, Muslim women wearing religious attire, and immigrant women workers).
8. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4, Pillars I & IV, which particularly reflect the
evolving recognition of the need for the adoption of wider and more “soft” approaches to
countering terrorism that embody human rights considerations. For example, Pillar I of the UN
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy requires a preventive approach to mitigate a range of
human rights issues that can foster conditions conducive to terrorism, such as “prolonged
unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and
religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good
governance. . . .” Id. Pillar I. The fourth pillar is an even more direct nod to those States and
practitioners pushing for a human-right based approach as a fundamental premise in the fight
against terrorism; it “reaffirm[s] that the promotion and protection of human rights for all and
the rule of law is essential to all components of the Strategy, recogniz[es] that effective
counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but
complementary and mutually reinforcing, and stress[es] the need to promote and protect the
rights of victims of terrorism. . . .” Id. Pillar IV. For feminist analyses of international law and
its institutions extending beyond the immediate 9/11 moment see Jayne Huckerby, Gender,
Counter-Terrorism and International Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TERRORISM AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 163 (Ben Saul ed., 2014); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Relevance of the
Women, Peace and Security Agenda to the War on Terror, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(forthcoming 2016); Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4 (challenging the narrative
of marginalization of feminism from national security and counter-terrorism discourses); A
DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7 (analyzing the
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“governance feminism,” similarly do not speak to questions of
gender, law, and national security in the post-9/11 era. Instead, they
predominantly address a large body of practice in feminist organizing
on international law and institutions that took place primarily in the
1990s9—especially with regard to successes of the feminist
movement in establishing war crimes tribunals10—and therefore
ahead of those events of 9/11 that subsequently indelibly altered the
landscape of international law, its notions of sovereignty and human
rights, and its traditional public/private divides.11 As a result, there is
no sufficient feminist account of international law that goes beyond
the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to scrutinize the gender dimensions
and impacts of an evolving national security landscape that—
primarily through a new field of policy and activities known as
countering violent extremism (“CVE”)12—increasingly seeks to
incorporate “soft” approaches such as promotion of the rule of law,
human rights, gender equality, and development, alongside traditional
law enforcement, military, and intelligence responses.
Accordingly, when feminist approaches to international law seek
to diagnose and explain the current state of international law and
gender dimensions and gender impacts of US counter-terrorism policy, including the role of
development assistance).
9. SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 32 (“The 1990s was the decade par excellence of
the emergence of governance feminism.”); see also Halley et al., supra note 2.
10. Halley et al., supra note 2, at 342–47, n.10 (describing governance feminism as it
manifested in relation to the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC processes).
11. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 288 (2004) (noting the impact of the aftermath of 9/11 on
recalibrating international law and its institutions, including through new manifestations of
sovereignty as States operate through “government networks”).
12. The holistic approach reflected in the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006
paved the way for this increasingly core aspect of States’ strategic approaches to violent
extremism and terrorism. See G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4. There is no one universal
definition or understanding of what constitutes CVE, but in general terms it is understood as
having a preventive rather than post hoc orientation. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2178 ¶ 15 (Sept. 24,
2014) (addressing “countering violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism”);
Georgia Holmer, Countering Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective, U.S. INST. OF
PEACE, Sept. 2013, at 2 (“Counter violent extremism is a realm of policy, programs, and
interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with
radical political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups.”); Good Practices on
Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent
Extremism, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM 1 (2009) (“[CVE] initiatives tackle
conditions conducive to radicalization into violent extremism with the ultimate aim of denying
terrorist groups new supporters and recruits. The strategies and tools that governments and
civil society organizations use to counter violent extremism vary, reflecting differing
conditions and settings.”).
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institutions on gender equality, they miss quite a fundamental piece of
the relevant normative and political backdrop to such inquiries. In
contrast to this lacuna in feminist international law approaches,
feminist engagements in other fields—particularly in security studies,
international relations, and human security—have richly
problematized the meaning of security and the gendered components
of national and international security practice.13 This Article is in part
an exercise in catching feminist international law approaches up to
these analyses, but it also seeks to generate new lines of feminist
inquiry by engaging with the specific and hitherto unanswered
question of how the omnipotent and evolving national security
environment in the post-9/11 era, particularly as represented by
contemporary CVE policy and practice, affects international law on
gender equality and women’s human rights. Does such an account
13. See generally SUSAN FALUDI, THE TERROR DREAM: FEAR AND FANTASY IN POST9/11 AMERICA (2007) (using a historical perspective to amplify how the United States’
psychological response to 9/11 reified traditional images of women as fragile, victimized, and
in need of protection by men); MARITA GRONNVOLL, MEDIA REPRESENTATIONS OF GENDER
AND TORTURE POST-9/11 (2010) (examining gender and torture in media coverage post-9/11
to draw attention to the preoccupation with, and construction of, female perpetrators of
torture); Swati Parashar & Christine Sylvester, The Contemporary Mahabharata and the Many
Draupadis: Bringing Gender to Critical Terrorism Studies, in CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES
178 (Richard Jackson & Marie Breen Smyth, eds., 2009) (addressing the absence of women in
State-centric discourses concerning terrorism); Swati Parashar, Women, Militancy, and
Security: the South Asian Conundrum, in GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES 168 (Laura Sjoberg ed., 2009) (emphasizing the need for a gender perspective
on addressing various aspects of terrorism and its response); WOMEN, GENDER, AND
TERRORISM (Laura Sjoberg & Caron E. Gentry eds., 2011) (analyzing the complexities of
women’s participation in terrorism); Aili Mari Tripp, Towards a Gender Perspective on
Human Security and Violence, in GENDER, VIOLENCE AND HUMAN SECURITY 3, 13 (Aili Mari
Tripp, Myra Marx Ferree & Christina Ewig eds., 2013) (noting the dangers of the
incorporation of women’s needs in State-based national security and military measures); Eric
M. Blanchard, Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security
Theory, 28 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y, 1289, 1289 (2003) (“National security
discourses are typically part of the elite world of masculine high politics.”); Heidi Hudson,
‘Doing’ Security As Though Humans Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the
Politics of Human Security, 36 SECURITY DIALOGUE 155, 156, 165 (2005) (stating that
“[g]ender is intrinsic to the subject matter and politics of security” and arguing with regard to
post-9/11 effects that “security in one area depends on insecurity in another, as the ripple
effects of homeland security measures after 9/11 are felt across the globe”); Jan Jindy Pettman,
Feminist International Relations After 9/11, 10 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 85, 92 (2004)
(demonstrating that the events of 9/11 and its aftermath have legitimated military action and
revitalized traditional notions of masculinities and femininities and have “also disrupted and
damaged the slow uneven moves towards the incorporation of some feminist concepts into
international politics and policy making”); J. Ann Tickner, Feminist Perspectives on 9/11, 3
INT’L STUD. PERSP. 333 (2002) (analyzing the post-9/11 moment through a gender lens).
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point to feminist irrelevance, governance, or something else? To trace
these evolutions in feminism and international law in the post-9/11
era, Part I addresses the feminist legal responses to the “War on
Terror,” or the global war against terrorism, particularly those offered
in the immediate aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. I
chart both the descriptive and predictive aspects of these accounts,
identifying the range of feminist forecasts of what would happen to
international law and institutions on women’s rights and gender
equality in the aftermath of 9/11. I am particularly interested in what
this review indicates about how feminist legal theorists and
practitioners subsequently set their gender equality agendas of the
next fourteen years, as well as how it affected their capacity to
identify and address how an evolving and omnipotent national
security context impacted the development of women’s rights during
this period. While some fault-lines in feminist approaches in
international law are identified in these analyses, their shared focus on
the immediate post-9/11 moments and the militarized security
responses that followed is marked.
Against this backdrop, Part II analyzes feminism and
international law in the long shadow of 9/11, addressing the long-term
impacts of the immediate response to the events of 9/11, as well as
those of this evolving and omnipotent national security landscape that
increasingly mobilizes areas such as rule of law, human rights, and
development—and indeed, sometimes women’s rights and gender
equality—as part of holistic efforts to counter terrorism and violent
extremism.14 This is a slightly different, though not entirely separate,
project from applying a gender lens to analyze counter-terrorism and
CVE, a task I have undertaken elsewhere.15 In other words, I am less
concerned in this Article with only seeing counter-terrorism and CVE
through the lens of gender, and more with seeing gender against the
broader backdrop of the evolving and overarching context of counterterrorism and CVE, although the two exercises cannot be entirely
separated and their inter-linkages are highlighted as necessary. This
review particularly addresses the question of how contemporary
14. For those accounts of the gender, human rights, and legal aspects and implications of
counter-terrorism that analyze beyond the immediate 9/11 moment, see generally Gender,
Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8; Ní Aoláin, supra note 8; Feminism as
Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4; JAYNE HUCKERBY, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOB.
JUSTICE, WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE U.S. AND U.K. EXPERIENCES
(2012); A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7.
15. See generally Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8.
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national security discourse and practice utilize concepts of gendered
victimhood and vulnerability (e.g., women as victims of terrorism) in
ways that compromise the transformative potential of international
law for women. It also includes scrutiny of how a post-9/11 revival of
international law’s formalism has affected the discipline’s capacity to
develop gender equality norms and particularly reduced attention to
State-based violations against women in the name of countering
terrorism. Additional normative impacts related to the conjoining of
women’s rights (and women, peace, and security) and national
security agendas, as well as the securitization and instrumentalization
of women’s rights in national security law and practice, are also
identified and analyzed as consequences of this broader national
security landscape. In addition to these legal and normative questions,
I also consider how, in practice, the contemporary terror/counterterror landscape has affected the possibilities for transnational and
inclusive feminist organizing, as well as the success of other feminist
methods for analyzing international law from a gender perspective.
Across these areas of inquiry in Parts I and II, I pay particular
attention to explicitly delineating which feminisms and which
women’s rights are most implicated in, and by, national security and
international law discourses. Indeed, this Article takes as a starting
point that there is no one feminist account of international law and
that these divergences in feminist approaches to terrorism, counterterrorism, and international law need to be so identified as they are
instructive on which perspectives have ultimate analytic purchase in
the choices that international law and its institutions make on how to
recognize women’s rights and gender equality. While being mindful
of these differences among feminist engagements with international
law, Part II also seeks to provide a series of preliminary insights on
how a framework for moving toward a more comprehensive feminist
account(s) of international law and the impact of national security
policy and practice might look. While the full development of this
alternate framework—or perhaps frameworks—is beyond the scope
of this Article, I argue that a feminist international law project that
seeks to make women’s rights and gender equality concerns visible in
the current national security context must address a series of macro
and micro questions across at least the four areas of: women’s
participation in terrorism and violent extremism; women’s roles in
countering terrorism and violent extremism and the relationship
between gender equality and national security more broadly; the
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gendered effects of terrorism and violent extremism; and the impacts
of countering terrorism and violent extremism on women, girls, and
gender equality. Accordingly, Part II also contains reflections on
these four aspects, as well as how each of these areas relate to each
other, to pose future questions for feminist international law
engagement with these issues.
I. FEMINIST LEGAL CRITIQUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN
THE POST-9/11 MOMENT
Early feminist legal responses to the “War on Terror” correctly
identified a number of incidents of gendered exclusion in the
immediate post-9/11 reaction. Deploying the feminist method of
searching for and mapping of “silences,”16 such accounts pointed to
the fact that almost all notable actors involved in the perpetration of
terrorism, as well as those involved in designing and implementing
counter-terrorism measures, were male.17 Additionally, these legal
analyses stressed the significant influence of a series of gendered, and
often heavily racialized, narratives in the post-9/11 public debate and
policy response.18 In such narratives, socially constructed categories
16. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity for
Transformation, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 345, 347 (2002) (“Our project, as feminists, must
in large part be to map the silences of international law, and fill those silences with our own
voices.”); Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
379, 381 (1999) (“A methodology sometimes employed to question the objectivity of a
discipline is that of detecting its silences.”); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley
Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613, 615 (1991) (“By
taking women seriously and describing the silences and fundamentally skewed nature of
international law, feminist theory can identify possibilities for change.”).
17. Hilary Charlesworth, The Hidden Gender of International Law, 16 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 93, 98–100 (2002) [hereinafter Hidden Gender] (querying “What About Women?”
and reflecting that “[a]n initial observation that can be made about the events of September
11th and their aftermath is that women have not been featured in any way as involved in any of
the crucial decisions”); Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 600 (posing the
question “Sex: Where Are the Women?” and observing that “[a]s the events first unfolded,
women were invisible, except as victims alongside men. Men made all of the crucial decisions
involved in the hijackings and the responses to them. No women have been identified among
the hijackers and their backers”); Kfir, supra note 6, at 84 (“9/11 highlighted how invisible
women continue to be in times of national crises. . . .”); MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 3 (“On
the perpetrators’ side, the atrocities were hardly sex- or gender-neutral.”). Similar observations
were also made amongst feminist international relations and security studies scholars. See,
e.g., Blanchard, supra note 13; Tickner, supra note 13, at 335 (“So where did all the women
go?”).
18. Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 604 (“[S]ex has been a crucial
aspect of the events of September 11 and the response to them. Men have been the major
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of feminine and masculine were dominant and this typecasting
supported the Western-led, hyper-masculinized responses (e.g.,
military action)19 as necessary to protect women as vulnerable victims
of male, brown terrorists.20 The effect was also to produce a series of
binaries that were at once decisive and divisive, encapsulated in the
refrain of US President George W. Bush’s government (the ‟Bush
Administration”): “Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists.”21 These feminist accounts also articulated how gendered
approaches to the issue of terrorism were essentially reductive,
belying the complexity of the causal events leading up to 9/11, as well
as favoring short-term and militaristic responses that precluded more
systemic, long-term approaches to countering terrorism, such as
“fund[ing] sophisticated long-term education programs in the Middle
East.”22 In such feminist readings, the immediate post-9/11
environment that excluded women’s experiences and marginalized
their participation in security institutions and decision-making, as
well as the resort to masculinized, militarized, and State-centric
responses, exemplified the very “male organizational and normative
players in all contexts and women have been cast as victims without real agency to affect the
future.”); Hidden Gender, supra note 17, at 98–102 (tracing the mobilization of both feminized
and masculine imagery in the response to the events of 9/11).
19. See, e.g., Saloom, supra note 7, at 170-72 (identifying a number of ways in which the
“masculinist culture of the military” manifests). For similar observations in feminist
international relations approaches, see, e.g., Pettman, supra note 13, at 92 (identifying how the
response to 9/11 “replayed the usual close associations of nationalism, war, and masculinity,
and generated competing masculinities and stigmatized femininities”).
20. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 296 (“[A]longside the limited narrative of
terrorist actors as rogue male actors functioning outside the boundaries of the state, are images
of women’s sexual vulnerability and need for protection. . . .”); Johnstone, supra note 7, at 44
(“[T]he discourse of the ‘War on Terror’ itself revealed a perceived need for the state to define
its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and women as
victims.”).
21. President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html. See also Hidden Gender, supra note 17, at 101 (“Another dichotomy that
has been used a lot is, ‘You are either with us or against us.’ There is no middle ground.”);
Pettman, supra note 13, at 92 (noting the events of 9/11 and its aftermath “activated bounded
and binary international identity politics in which both women and gender played a central
part, in representation and legitimation”).
22. Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 605; see also Katie Rose Guest
Pryal, The Rhetoric of Sissy-Slogans: How Denigrating the Feminine Perpetuates the Terror
Wars, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 503, 506 (2012) (“[T]he use of sissy-slogans. . . . have not
only gained traction because of 9/11 and the ensuing terror wars, but have, in cyclical fashion,
helped to perpetuate the terror wars by discursively shutting down potential for non-military
action.”).
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structure of the international legal system”23 that had been the focus
of feminist international law scholars a decade earlier. The
predominance in national security discourse of the Western narrative
of “rescuing” Third World and Muslim women—at its most explicit
in calls to invade Afghanistan in 2001 in part to liberate women
suppressed by the Taliban24—also reflected “second-wave” feminist
critiques that had argued that early feminist approaches to
international law had unduly homogenized women’s experience and
excluded women in the Global South, including by emphasizing their
victimhood status.25
For other feminist legal responses, these instances of exclusion
and invisibility rose from the episodic to the meta, with the potential
to disrupt and derail the project of gender equality under international
law.26 Indeed, one core theme—either implicit or explicit—in many
feminist accounts of the post-9/11 era is that of gain reversal, the idea
that the aftermath of the events of 9/11 marked the beginning of a
sustained peeling-back of feminist advances in international law and
institutions, particularly those developed during the 1990s, which had
seen significant achievements in a number of areas of pressing
concern to feminist engagement in international law. The impact on
23. Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 614.
24. See Radio Address by Mrs. Bush (Nov. 17, 2001), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011117.html (identifying the intention of the address as
being “to kick off a world-wide effort to focus on the brutality against women and children by
the al-Qaida terrorist network and the regime it supports in Afghanistan, the Taliban”).
25. See Kapur, supra note 7, at 214 (“[T]he ‘War on Terrorism’ and its secondary goal of
protecting women has been addressed largely within the rhetoric of religion, civilization, and
‘a just war,’ rather than a concern for women’s human rights. The focus on women’s concerns
through the prism of religion and culture not only serves to cast Muslim women as ‘Other,’ it
also serves to justify the liberating impulse of military intervention. . . .”); see also id. at 224
(“Feminists in particular must pay heed to a history where such interventions have reinforced
the assumptions of women in the postcolonial world as backward and as victims of a barbaric
practice.”). See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, & Shelley Wright, Feminist
Approaches to International Law: Reflections from Another Century, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW: MODERN FEMINIST APPROACHES 17, 27 (Doris Buss & Ambreena Manji eds., 2005)
(“[A] major concern of those promoting women’s international human rights [is] avoiding
essentialising women and recognising the diversity in the situations and priorities of women
around the world.”); Brooks, supra note 16, at 353–54 (“‘Second phase’ critics note that even
within elite Western feminist scholarly circles, one woman’s bread is another woman’s poison.
Surely, then, it is a form of arrogance to insist that the world’s three billion women have a
common perspective on such a highly problematized subject as ‘rights.’”); Feminist
Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 618 (“An alternative, feminist analysis of
international law must take account of the differing perspectives of First and Third World
feminists.”).
26. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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developments in promoting women’s participation in institutions, as
well as on newly-enhanced normative protections in the area of
women’s rights, were of particular concern.27
To fully understand the nature of these concerns, it is necessary
at this juncture to provide a snapshot of the improving state of
international law on gender equality in the period leading up to the
events of 9/11. Such progress included traction on the concept of
women’s rights as human rights,28 particularly through a focus on
gender-based violence;29 the adoption of the first international
instrument—albeit a criminal law rather than human rights one—to
address trafficking in persons, with a particular focus on women and
children in 2000;30 and a series of developments in international
criminal law, including the adoption of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court in 1998,31 which aimed to better address
the experience of women in internal and international armed conflict.
Significantly, only a year prior to 9/11, the women, peace, and
security agenda was formally installed at the United Nations (UN)
with the adoption of the landmark UN Security Council Resolution
(“UNSCR”) 1325 (“UNSCR 1325”).32 Recognizing that peace is
“inextricably” linked with gender equality, the women, peace, and
security policy framework embodied in UNSCR 1325 and subsequent
resolutions33 provided a key and unprecedented international platform
27. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 297 (“A further consequence of the discourse
on the global war against terrorism is the averting of attention from women’s rights and
women’s participation at the international level.”).
28. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, International Law from the Bottom Up: Fragmentation and
Transformation, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687, 700 (2013) (“Women’s rights became a focus of
international law in the 1990s.”).
29. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Ulrich, Confronting Gender-Based Violence with International
Instruments: Is a Solution to the Pandemic Within Reach?, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
629, 629 (2000) (“Within the past two decades, international actors have devoted increasing
attention to the crisis of gender-based violence.”).
30. Protocol To Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 (entered into force Dec. 25,
2003) [hereinafter UN Trafficking Protocol].
31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July
17, 1998).
32. S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).
33. See Press Release, Security Council, Peace Inextricably Linked with Equality
between Women and Men Says Security Council, in International Women’s Day Statement,
U.N. Press Release SC/6816 (Mar. 8, 2000) (“[T]he Security Council recognize that peace is
inextricably linked with equality between women and men. . . . [and] that the equal access and
full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the
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for increased women’s participation at all levels of conflict
prevention, mediation, rule of law, peacekeeping and peacebuilding;
the protection of women and girls during armed conflict; and the
prevention of gender-based violence.34 The adoption of UNSCR 1325
was momentous and is particularly key for understanding the goals
and configuration of much feminist organizing at the international
level heading into the new century. Specifically, following sustained
advocacy by feminist and human rights groups, UNSCR 1325
“marked the arrival of . . . ‘International Conflict Feminism’ . . . as a
player in global power politics,”35 where “international conflict
feminism” is understood to encompass “feminist initiatives that are
aimed at strengthening the international law and policy arena’s
response to women’s experience of war through measures that expand
recognition and redress for harms suffered, and increase inclusion of
women in justice and peace measures addressing contexts of conflict
and war.”36 As well as providing an entry point for the influence of
this specific form of feminist organizing, UNSCR 1325 locked in the
ongoing presence and influence of women, peace, and security actors
in international, regional, and domestic forums, by providing “a focus
for continuing engagement between the Council and women’s peace
and human rights advocates.”37

prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace
and security.”). See generally S.C. Res. 2242 (Oct. 13, 2015); S.C. Res. 2122 (Oct. 18, 2013);
S.C. Res. 2106 (June 24, 2013); S.C. Res. 1960 (Dec. 16, 2010); S.C. Res. 1889 (Oct. 5,
2009); S.C. Res. 1888 (Sept. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 1325, supra
note 32.
34. See Dianne Otto, A Sign of “Weakness”? Disrupting Gender Certainties in the
Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 113, 116
(2006) [hereinafter A Sign of “Weakness”?] (noting that the adoption of UNSCR 1325
“promis[ed] new opportunities for entry into the ‘master’s house’”); see also Catherine
O’Rourke, ‘Walk[ing] the Halls of Power’? Understanding Women’s Participation in
International Peace and Security, 15 MELB. J. INT’L L. 128, 133 (2014) (“[T]he feminist
emphasis on participation within existing institutions can be seen as part of a wider move from
oppositional to more integrationist feminist strategies.”).
35. Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4, at 127.
36. Id. at 142 n.2 (citation omitted). See generally Vasuki Nesiah, Uncomfortable
Alliances: Women, Peace, and Security in Sri Lanka, in SOUTH ASIAN FEMINISMS 139 (Ania
Loomba & Ritty A. Lukose eds., 2012) (addressing the impact of UNSCR 1325 and
international conflict feminism in the context of Sri Lanka).
37. A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at 116 (“Since its adoption, the Resolution
has provided a focus for continuing engagement between the Council and women’s peace and
human rights advocates. Remarkably, the Resolution has also become a grassroots tool for
women’s peace advocates.”).
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Although some feminist approaches were concerned with the
fallout from the rise in prominence of national security practice in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11, others saw active opportunities for
advancing women’s rights, or were at least worried about the risks of
shutting down such opportunities. Governments’ efforts to justify preemptive use of force in Afghanistan and Iraq as being in part to
“save” women in particular provided validation for those feminists
concerned primarily with “images of the female mother/child/victim
requiring protection.”38 Other feminists also acquiesced when the
Bush Administration increased its attention to women and
international law questions by emphasizing the need to invade
Afghanistan to rescue Afghani women from the Taliban and in its
aggressive support for international action against sex trafficking.39
Such feminist acquiescence existed even as the Administration
framed both issues as also having a very clear nexus to its national
security policy.40 Indeed, this appeal to international law and
women’s rights and its viewing through a national security lens was
not necessarily accidental; it had the effect of silencing normally
critical voices such as feminists and liberal internationalists, who did
not want to jeopardize losing what was perceived as a slender but
critical window of opportunity to advance international law and
38. Heathcote, supra note 7, at 297; see also Farida Shaheed, The “War on Terror” and
Women’s Rights: A Pakistan-Afghan Perspective, in LOST LIBERTIES: ASHCROFT AND THE
ASSAULT ON PERSONAL FREEDOM 222 (Cynthia Brown ed., 2003) (“[U]sing the rallying cry
of women’s oppression in Afghanistan in the opening chapter of the ‘war on terror’ hijacked
the women’s rights discourse and conscripted it in the service of military actions, making a
mockery of genuine women’s rights activism.”); Feminist Approaches to International Law:
Reflections from Another Century, supra note 25, at 19 (examining how women’s rights
function to detect terrorists and to legitimatize coercive state responses through “the
identification of the enemy in the war on terror with repressive treatment of women and the
development of the notion of a war for women’s rights”); Kapur, supra note 7, at 214. On the
role of women’s rights in justifying humanitarian intervention, see generally Karen Engle,
“Calling in the Troops”: The Uneasy Relationship Among Women’s Rights, Human Rights,
and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 217–26 (2007); Deborah M.
Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (2004) (tracing the ways in which humanitarian and human rights
concerns justified colonization in US foreign policy).
39. See Karen Engle, Liberal internationalism, feminism, and the suppression of
critique: Contemporary approaches to global order in the United States, 46 HARV. INT’L. L.J.
427, 427 (2005).
40. See, e.g., Jayne C. Huckerby, Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, in GENDER,
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 4, at 106 (tracing the trafficking-terror nexus and its impacts on the human rights of
trafficked persons, especially women).
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gender equality.41 Other feminist accounts were less sanguine in
seeking to capitalize upon the opportunities presented by aggressive
counter-terrorism responses that pursued non-State actors and looked
eagerly to the might and magnitude of international law’s response to
terrorism as a basis for generating strong responses to violence
against women by private men.42 Such efforts also coincided with a
set of feminist accounts that sought to define violations of women’s
rights themselves as acts of terrorism.43 This early acquiescence—and
in some cases outright support—of some feminist voices with
counter-terrorism actions and discourse prefigured a more expansive
conjoining of women’s rights under international law with national
security objectives, which I address further below in Part II.44
II. FEMINISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE LONG
SHADOW OF 9/11
A. The Role of Victimhood and Gendered Vulnerability
One of the core concerns in some feminist approaches to
international law has been how much its achievements—including
particularly in the adoption of the women, peace, and security agenda,
and the advancement of International Conflict Feminism—have
41. See Engle, supra note 39, at 430 (noting that the Bush Administration’s appeal to
international law confined the parameters of discourse in the United States to the non-question
of “are we for or against using international law to protect women’s rights?,” rather than more
difficult questions about what this protection entails and why international law is mobilized in
respect of some women’s rights issues and not others).
42. See MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 19 (“What will it take for violence against women,
this daily war, this terrorism against women as women that goes on every day worldwide, this
everyday, group-based, systematic threat to and crime against the peace, to receive a response
in the structure and practice of international law anything approximate to the level of focus and
determination inspired by the September 11th attacks?”); see also id. at 28 (“This is not to
argue that the war on terror is the right model for opposing violence against women. It is rather
to expose, against the template of one reality of what men getting serious looks like, the
commonalities between the problems they address and those they ignore, as well as what
unites the solutions they implement and the problems they continue to fail to solve.”).
43. Such approaches have tended to be developed in relation to the analysis of sexual
violence, including in conflict settings. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL:
MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 209 (1975) (“[M]en who commit rape have served in effect as
front-line masculine shock troops, terrorist guerrillas in the longest sustained battle the world
has ever known.”); ROBIN MORGAN, THE DEMON LOVER: ON THE SEXUALITY OF
TERRORISM (1989); Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former
Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries,
46 AM. U. L. REV. 793 (1997).
44. See infra notes 136–173 and accompanying text.
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“depended on an investment in women’s victimhood.”45 The
particular concerns here are that such “hegemony of ‘victimhood’ as
the framework for politics risks denying women’s agency and
producing/reinforcing identity claims premised on injury,”46 and
significantly, for the purposes of assessing feminist gains over the last
fourteen years, limits the transformative potential of feminist
strategies under international law.47 “Governance feminism”
scholarship has similarly tended to emphasize how gendered notions
of vulnerability are often “docked”48 in international law and
institutions to the detriment of recognizing women’s various
expressions of agency. This Section traces how these critiques have or
have not manifested in the post-9/11 era by looking at how
international law and policy have metabolized the following features
of this omnipotent national security environment: the impact of
terrorist violence on women and girls, as well as the active roles of
women in both terrorism and its response.
As a starting point, in practice, counter-terrorism and CVE
policy regularly use images of women’s vulnerability and harm,
including as a means to justify counter-terrorism actions.49 As
mentioned above, this was starkly evinced early in the aftermath of
9/11 with the effort to justify military intervention to “save” women
as victims of the Taliban in Afghanistan.50 In the intervening years,
however, the connection between women victims of terrorism and
national security policy has become more nuanced and also more
widespread. In particular, from 2006 onward, counter-terrorism and
CVE policy contained a new focus on the need to combat the
dehumanization of victims to prevent terrorism, as well as to, more
45. Vasuki Nesiah, Feminist Interventions: Human Rights, Armed Conflicts and
International Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 67, 68 (2009); see also Feminist Methods
in International Law, supra note 16, at 381 (“Women are not completely absent from the
international legal order. . . . But, by and large, when women enter into focus at all in
international law, they are viewed in a very limited way, often as victims, particularly as
mothers, or potential mothers, in need of protection.”).
46. Nesiah, supra note 45, at 68.
47. See id.
48. See Halley et al., supra note 2, at 336; see also Rape at Rome, supra note 2, at 123
(“[F]eminist universalism and its war-against-women understanding of conflicts . . .
reproduces in reverse the blind-spotted moral vision that it contests. It is completely inattentive
to the possibility that women have been the instigators or perpetrators of conflict.”).
49. See Heathcote, supra note 7, at 296. For a similar observation on the
instrumentalization of women as victims of terrorism, see Tickner, supra note 13, at 340-41.
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

2016]

FEMINISM IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

549

broadly, make human rights an integral part of combating terrorism.51
Both of these features of contemporary national security practice
provided a crucial entry point for the uptake of those feminist
perspectives focused on the gendered targeting of women and girls by
terrorist and violent extremist groups and, in particular, on sexual
violence.52 Accordingly, contemporary national security practice has
shown an increasing concern with these gendered impacts of
terrorism and violent extremism in a range of conflict and nonconflict contexts,53 including by Al-Shabaab in Somalia54 and, most
recently, by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in parts of Iraq
and Syria.55 Gendered targeting of women in the north of Mali by
“extremist Islamist groups;”56 the attack on Malala Yousafzai in
Pakistan by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in Swat, Pakistan;57 and
51. For example, Pillar I of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy requires a
preventive approach to mitigate a range of human rights issues that can foster conditions
conducive to terrorism, such as “prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human
rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic
marginalization and lack of good governance.” G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4, Pillar I; see
also id. Pillar IV (on the promotion of human rights).
52. For an example of an explanation for the use of sexual violence by terrorists and
violent extremists, see, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Conflict-related Sexual Violence, ¶ 83,
U.N. Doc. S/2015/203 (Mar. 23, 2015) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. S/2015/203] (observing patterns
of sexual violence as perpetrated by violent extremists and concluding that such violence “is
not incidental, but integrally linked with the strategic objectives, ideology and funding of
extremist groups.”).
53. See, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Women and
Peace and Security, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/2014/693 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
S/2014/693] (recognizing the targeted nature of terrorist and violent extremist attacks on
women and girls as follows: “Other developments of concern include targeted violence and
human rights violations linked to terrorism committed against women and girls. . . .”); id. ¶ 46
(“As violent extremism continues to spread, there is growing recognition that women’s rights
are under threat and that the role of women in countering terrorism and extremism is
underutilized. . . . In societies with higher gender equality, extremism is less likely to take root
and women are less vulnerable to its impacts.”). See also Good Practices on Women and
Countering Violent Extremism, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM, Good Practices #5,
#21, #22 (2015) (the author was involved in the OSCE process that preceded this document).
54. See Anne-Yolande Bilala, Women and Al-Shabab: Between False Empowerment and
Terror, DIPLOMATIC COURIER (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.diplomaticourier.com/news/
regions/africa/252-women-and-al-shabab-between-false-empowerment-and-terror.
55. See S.C. Res. 2169, preambular ¶ 13 (July 30, 2014); Haleh Esfandiari, ISIS’s
Cruelty Toward Women Gets Scant Attention, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.
com/washwire/2014/09/02/isiss-cruelty-toward-women-gets-scant-attention/
56. See UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali,
¶¶ 21–24, U.N. Doc. S/2012/894 (Nov. 28, 2012).
57. See generally Malala Yousafzai, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/profile/
malala-yousafzai (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
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the kidnapping and abduction of women and girls by terrorist groups,
including the abductions of Nigerian schoolgirls by Boko Haram58
and of Yazidi women by ISIS,59 are also high-profile instances of
targeting of women that have attracted international attention and, at
times, been used to incentivize or justify an international response led
by counter-terrorism actors.
International law’s account of the impact of terrorist violence on
women and girls, however, has often been problematic from a gender
and human rights perspective. The first challenge is that it is often
unduly focused on sexual violence.60 This has led to less attention to
other gender-specific impacts of violent extremism and terrorism
including, for example, restrictions on freedom of movement and
dress, unequal distribution of aid and food, and banning or otherwise
inhibiting access to education, particularly in areas under control of
terrorist groups.61 This focus on hyper-vulnerability can also translate
into a lack of precision regarding women’s experiences vis-à-vis
terrorist groups. For example, while a rumor that ISIS had mandated
female genital mutilation in Mosul, Iraq62 was quickly discredited,
such false accusations skew protection and prevention efforts and
hamper victims’ credibility in situations where victims often already
have trouble being believed. This critique echoes that which is often
made of the women, peace, and security agenda; that it unduly relies
on notions of victimhood and vulnerability to promote women’s

58. See, e.g., Adam Nossiter, New Kidnapping Reported in Nigeria as U.S. Offers Help,
N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, at A1.
59. See S.C. Res. 2199, preambular ¶ 14 (Feb. 12, 2015); Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe
Systematic Rape, Yezidi Survivors in Need of Urgent Care, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 15,
2015), http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/iraq-isis-escapees-describe-systematic-rape.
60. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/2015/203, supra note 52, ¶ 82 (“The confluence of crises
wrought by violent extremism has revealed a shocking trend of sexual violence employed as a
tactic of terror by radical groups.”).
61. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/2014/693, supra note 53, ¶ 46. See also RADHIKA
COOMARASWAMY, PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE:
A GLOBAL STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 1325, 223-25 (2015) [hereinafter PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING
JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE] (the author contributed to the background of this study); Good
Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practice #5.
62. See Lucy Westcott, ISIS Denies UN Claim it Ordered Female Genital Mutilation in
Mosul, NEWSWEEK (July 25, 2014), http://www.newsweek.com/isis-deny-un-claim-theyreordering-female-genital-mutilation-mosuls-women-261323.
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protection under international law and by international institutions
with a disproportionate focus on sexualized victimhood.63
Second, an emphasis on women’s victimhood has undermined
women’s roles as agents in post-9/11 global governance, including in
the specific areas of terrorism and its prevention. Concerning the
former issue of gender, terrorism, and violent extremism,
contemporary national security practice regularly fails to address the
role of gender identities and norms in the various drivers of
“radicalization” of men—such as in terrorist propaganda that
encourages women to foster violence by male family members and
uses gender-based violations in counter-terrorism efforts (e.g.,
invasive screening of female passengers at airports) and norms around
masculinity to inspire violent extremism and terrorism by men64—as
well as the specific question of drivers for women’s participation in
violent extremism.65 Instead, research and policy attention to the issue
of women’s involvement in violent extremism, tends to unduly rely
on the phenomenon of women suicide bombers66 and to flatten
women’s motivations for participating in violent extremism or
terrorism on the basis of gender stereotypes, such as the idea that
women are inherently peaceful and involved as pawns or victims, or
only join terrorist organizations to become “jihadi brides.”67 Such
analyses belie the extent of women’s varied involvement, which in
63. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 298 (arguing that the women, peace, and
security agenda as developed through the UN Security Council “links women’s peace and
security with sexual vulnerability”); O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 134 (“In particular, there is
concern that the WPS agenda has retrenched and institutionalised protective stereotypes of
women as vulnerable, sexualised and inherently predisposed to peacemaking.”). But see Power
and Danger, supra note 1, at 116–18 (tracing the role of “protective stereotypes of women” in
the first four thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security and arguing that there has
been some evolution from the initial emphasis on gendered vulnerability).
64. See, e.g., Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note
53, Good Practices #2, #8; ORG. FOR SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., WOMEN AND TERRORIST
RADICALIZATION: FINAL REPORT 3-4 (2013) [hereinafter WOMEN AND TERRORIST
RADICALIZATION: FINAL REPORT].
65. One of the few and early references within the UN system to the need to apply a
gender lens to “radicalization” is in Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a MultiSectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM
7–8 (2013) (“CVE programming should place a specific emphasis on youth at risk of
radicalization and recruitment. . . . Program design should, where appropriate, take into
account the different needs of young women versus young men.”). See also Good Practices on
Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practices #2, #8, #9.
66. WOMEN AND TERRORIST RADICALIZATION: FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, ¶ 7.
67. See infra note 70 and accompanying text; Good Practices on Women and Countering
Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practices #2, #8.
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addition to roles as suicide bombers or fighters,68 includes
participation as “sympathizers and mobilizers,”69 and in intelligence,
recruitment, all-female brigades, and as legitimizers of state-building
aspirations of terrorist groups.70
On the question of women’s participation as agents in preventing
or countering terrorism and violent extremism and the relationship
between women’s rights and national security more broadly, the
feminism and post-9/11 international law story becomes notably more
complicated. Indeed, in somewhat of a contrast to the feminist
narrative of the immediate post-9/11 moment—which identified
women’s almost complete invisibility in decision-making71—one key
consequence of a more recent move toward “soft” practices in
countering terrorism and violent extremism has been an upswing in
efforts to promote security initiatives that include women.72
Reflecting an understanding of the failings of “hard,” coercive
counter-terrorism efforts, current national security thinking often
stresses that overt government presence or footprint in initiatives to
68. See, e.g., MIA BLOOM, BOMBSHELL: THE MANY FACES OF WOMEN TERRORISTS
(2011).
69. See, e.g., Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Rafia Barakat & Liat Shetret, The Roles Of
Women In Terrorism, Conflict, And Violent Extremism: Lessons For The United Nations And
International Actors, CENTER ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION 3 (2013),
http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Carolyn Hoyle, Alexandra Bradford & Ross Frenett, Becoming Mulan?:
Female Western Migrants to ISIS, INST. FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE (2015), http://www.
strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_Becoming_Mulan_01.15_WEB.PDF; Erin Marie Saltman &
Melanie Smith, ‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon, INST. FOR
STRATEGIC DIALOGUE, (2015), http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_
Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf; Jayne Huckerby, Opinion, When Women
Become Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2015, at A27.
71. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also infra note 75 and accompanying
text.
72. See Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8. For examples
of these initiatives, see Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra
note 53; Hearing on Women’s Education: Promoting Development, Countering Radicalism;
Markup of H.R. 3583, Malala Yousafzai Scholarship Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014); WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE
U.S. AND U.K. EXPERIENCES, supra note 14; Frank Van Lierde, Looking for That Other Face:
Women Muslim Leaders and Violent Extremism in Indonesia, CORDAID (2013), http://www.
cordaid.org/media/publications/Cordaid_Other_Face_-LRtotaal_voor_web.pdf; ORG. FOR SEC.
& COOPERATION IN EUR., PREVENTING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
AND RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM: A COMMUNITY-POLICING APPROACH
142–45 (2014) [hereinafter PREVENTING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
AND RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM: A COMMUNITY-POLICING APPROACH];
WOMEN AND TERRORIST RADICALIZATION, supra note 64.
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combat terrorism is counter-productive, and that instead such efforts
should be lead more informally by non-governmental actors, such as
community members, religious leaders, youth, and women.73 For
example, recent instances of contemporary national security policies
that seek to facilitate the roles of women include programs to bolster
mothers’ capacity to address “radicalization;” promoting women’s
access to secular and religious education to provide alternate
narratives; support of women victims; supporting female family
members of terrorists; reforming community-policing to engage
women; and supporting women’s radio-listening clubs.74
However, despite these theoretical openings presented by a
move toward holistic approaches to countering terrorism and violent
extremism, the involvement of women, feminisms, and feminists in
this trajectory of national security practice and discourse over the past
fifteen years has been both marginal and patchy,75 and remains deeply
controversial.76 The “where are the women?”77 question, posed in
early feminist accounts of women’s invisibility in the immediate
aftermath of the events of 9/11, remains relevant as male actors still
overwhelmingly dominate the policy and practice of counterterrorism and countering violent extremism.78 Much like with the
women, peace, and security agenda, while there have been some
efforts to promote gender-sensitive and inclusive national security
policy, these tend to cluster at the informal or community level.79
73. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: The
White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] (“The Federal Government’s most effective role in strengthening
community partnerships and preventing violent extremism is as a facilitator, convener, and
source of research and findings.”).
74. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing initiatives).
75. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 16, at 346 (“To the minimal extent that women have
entered the male domain of international law and policy, they are often to be found clustered in
its ‘softer’ corners, where you find the more ‘feminine,’ ‘human interest’ subjects such as
refugee law and human rights law.”); Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1086 (“Men remain the
primary and visible actors in terrorist acts and counterterrorism responses.”).
76. See, e.g., PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE,
supra note 61, at 225-28; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4; infra notes 136-96 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Sex, Gender, and September 11, supra note 7, at 600 (posing the question
“Sex: Where Are the Women?”); Hidden Gender, supra note 17, at 98 (querying “[w]hat
[a]bout [w]omen?” and reflecting that “[a]n initial observation that can be made about the
events of September 11th and their aftermath is that women have not been featured in any way
as involved in any of the crucial decisions.”).
78. See sources cited supra note 17.
79. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Prevention and response frameworks that emphasize women’s
leadership in formal security institutions or promote gender-inclusive
and responsive security sector reform are still largely lacking.
Moreover, at the local level, governments’ efforts to counter violent
extremism by and large have tended to involve formal, often male,
“credible” community leaders to the exclusion of informal, and often
female, leaders. Further gendered effects flow from this: in some
cases, government support for such “credible voices” (including
former extremists) has elevated voices in the community otherwise
inimical to women’s rights concerns and feminist organizing.80
Additionally, major international institutions addressing women’s
rights protection have simply not been influential or consequential
actors in the national security space. A stark illustration of this is the
fact that UN Women (which came into existence in 2010) only
recently joined the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
Force, which was established in 2005. 81
Additionally, the rationale for such inclusion is often informed
by—and deploys—a series of stereotypes that focus only on women’s
roles in their “families and communities” or as victims of terrorism or
as inherently “peaceful” actors who will mitigate rather than foster
violent extremism and terrorism.82 Such stereotypes are redolent of
80. See A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note
7, at 27, 107–10. See also Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 147, 214 (2014) (noting that community policing “interlocutors, most of whom
are men, can further entrench their gatekeeper status,” such that “large segments of Muslim
communities, particularly youth and women, could suffer an intra-community subordinating
effect of being voiceless and bereft of individual agency.”).
81. See Report of the UN Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/60/825 ¶ 3 (Apr. 27, 2006)
(referencing the creation of CTITF in 2005 to “bring together key actors in the United Nations
system and its partners dealing with counter-terrorism issues.”).
82. See, e.g., Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note
53, Good Practices #3 (describing women’s “significant and varying roles,” but also noting
“[a]s a core part of families and communities, women and girls have vital contributions”), #13,
#15; Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools
to Counter Violent Extremism, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that it is good practice for
community engagement and community-oriented policing to “[e]ngage women as positive
change agents in their communities,” because “women, especially mothers, carry authority
within their families and communities which can translate into positive influence against
violent extremism”); id. at 8-9 (stating that “women can be a particularly critical actor in local
CVE efforts,” due to their role in their families, their knowledge of the local community, their
position as “locally knowledgeable, credible, and resonant CVE voices,” their potential for
identifying signs of radicalization and discouraging its occurrence, and their ability to serve as
“force-multiplier[s]” to raise awareness of, and build capacity among, other local women to
address radicalization); WOMEN AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE U.S. AND U.K.
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those of women in security discourse prior to the events of 9/11,
particularly in the women, peace, and security agenda, which
alongside images of women as sexualized and vulnerable victims,
mobilized images of women as peaceful and maternal as the rationale
for guaranteeing their participation in peace-building.83 Many
feminist accounts of the post-9/11 moment similarly identified the
influence of such ideas of gendered vulnerability and peacefulness in
supporting coercive action.84 However, this conventional feminist
understanding that gendered images of female vulnerability and male
strength post-9/11 enabled only military action is shown to be untrue
by a more comprehensive review of existing national security policy;
these later, broader, and “soft” national security practices—e.g.,
empowering mothers to combat violent extremism in their
communities, or as peacemakers in their communities, or as victims
of terrorism who provide credible counter-narratives to terrorism85—
also mobilized and reinforced such gendered images of vulnerability,
innocence and care. As such, this more recent account of
contemporary counter-terrorism and CVE shows how such images did
not shut down the potential for non-military action, but instead
dovetailed with it in certain circumstances.
Moreover, in many instances, the impetus for women’s inclusion
has not been one of gender equality, but has been advanced by
national security actors lacking a feminist perspective, but who
remain committed to the belief that incorporating women in national
security strategies—particularly in more localized and communityoriented “soft” measures aimed at building resilience—improves the
efficacy of these strategies.86 Such initiatives to include women tend
to be premised on the rationale that women may have “different
forms of influence” over their networks and that mainstreaming
gender and the inclusion of women leads to a more comprehensive
understanding of the causes of violent extremism, as well as more
EXPERIENCES, supra note 14, at 4–8 (tracing the rationales for incorporating a gender
perspective in UK policies to prevent violent extremism).
83. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 34, at 134; A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at
129 (noting that arguments by women’s peace advocates for women’s inclusion that utilize
“biologically-based ‘maternal’ gender representation . . . may, unwittingly, authorize women’s
continuing exclusion because they do not disrupt the gendered ideologies and practices that
maintain it”).
84. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 296-97.
85. See supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text.
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“localized, credible, inclusive, resonant” strategies to build
resilience.87 They rarely reflect the fact that women have a right to
equality and non-discrimination in participating in all areas of
decision-making, including those aimed at countering terrorism and
violent extremism. Instead, often, the dominant framing is the notion
that women should be empowered to counter terrorism and violent
extremism, reflecting an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption
that women are not already empowered, and that such empowerment
should be on its very terms instrumentalist as a means to achieving a
greater national security end rather than a goal in and of itself. Such
framings provide a platform for gendered images of women’s
vulnerability and detach the goals of women’s inclusion and gender
mainstreaming from substantive equality agendas in ways that can
make it difficult, without more, to read feminist success or
achievement in their adoption.
A third feature of the claims made about women’s victimhood
within national security discourse and practice is that they can tend to
be exclusive or hegemonic. This risks marginalizing the experience of
other targets of violent extremists, such as gay men or religious
minorities.88 It also can manifest in the claim that injury to men in
counter-terrorism is less important than the experiences of women at
the hands of terrorism (or counter-terrorism). Indeed, this risk has
been one of the main critiques aimed at “governance feminism,” that
the agenda has a distasteful appetite for tolerance of male suffering in
pursuit of feminist agendas.89 In the post-9/11 era, some feminist
perspectives have unfortunately been suggestive of this critique, in
particular those that have explicitly opposed human rights
organizations working with ex-Guantánamo Bay detainees to
highlight abusive detention practices90 or to challenge targeted
87. See Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53,
Good Practice #3. See also Good Practice #4 (“Protect the human rights of women and girls,
including their equality, non-discrimination, and equal participation, and ensure that CVE
efforts do not stereotype or instrumentalize, women and girls”). See further supra notes 72, 82,
and 162 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Hossam Bahgat, Explaining Egypt’s Targeting of Gays, MIDDLE EAST RES.
& INFO. PROJECT (July 23, 2001), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072301.
89. See SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 2, at 33 (“Unless it [feminism] Takes a Break from
itself, it can’t see injury to men”); Rape at Rome, supra note 2, at 123 (contesting governance
feminism’s emphasis on women’s victimhood and noting that “[w]orse, it involves a—to me
absolutely chilling—indifference to the suffering and death of men”).
90. See generally Amna Akbar & Rupal Oza, “Muslim Fundamentalism” and Human
Rights in an Age of Terror and Empire, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-
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killings91 on the basis that such human rights work undermines gender
equality advocacy, including because it takes insufficient account of
whether those whose rights are being defended themselves hold
positions inimical to women’s rights.
Finally, a post-9/11 account of women’s victimhood also tends
to focus unduly on women’s experiences at the hands of non-State
actors (terrorists), rather than to illuminate ways in which State
counter-terrorism policies have also undermined women’s rights92 or
to address a more complicated picture of victimhood whereby women
often feel squeezed between terror and anti-terror.93 Examples of this
squeezing effect include failure of asylum procedures to adequately
recognize gender-based violations by terrorist groups as a ground of
persecution; anti-terror cuts in aid, which are felt disproportionately
by women and girls who are reliant on development assistance and
instead then have to rely on violent extremists or terrorists to provide
such assistance; and government restrictions in funding to women’s
rights organizations working on the frontlines of the fight against
violent extremism and terrorism, which may also have their activities
chilled for fear of being charged with providing material support to
banned entities.94
TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 152; Diana Hortsch, The
Paradox of Partnership: Amnesty International, Responsible Advocacy, and NGO
Accountability, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 119 (2010); Richard Kerbaj, Amnesty
International is Damaged by Taliban Link, SUNDAY TIMES (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.the
sundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article197042.ece (containing the original allegations
of Gita Sahgal about Amnesty International’s relationship with Begg); Mindy Sawhney &
Ravindran Daniel, Working With Others: An Independent Review, AMNESTY INT’L (2010),
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/partnership_review_2010_0.pdf (outlining the
outcomes of the commissioned review of Sahgal’s concerns); Is Amnesty International
Supporting a Jihadist?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyId=124156482.
91. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Why I Spoke Out On Anwar al-Awlaki, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/19/humanrights-usa.
92. See infra notes 111–35 and accompanying text.
93. UN Secretary-General, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering terrorism, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/64/211 (Aug. 3, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/64/211] (“Those subject to gender-based abuses are often caught between targeting by
terrorist groups and the State’s counter-terrorism measures that may fail to prevent,
investigate, prosecute or punish these acts and may also perpetrate new human rights
violations with impunity.”).
94. See, e.g., id. ¶ 42 (“The Special Rapporteur is also concerned that terrorism financing
laws that restrict donations to non-profit organizations have particularly impacted
organizations that promote gender equality, including women’s rights organizations.”); id. ¶ 50
(“[F]orced domestic service for actors considered to be terrorists has been understood to count
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While it is beyond the scope of this Article to fully develop an
alternative gender and human rights framework(s) for addressing the
complexities of women’s victimhood and agency in terrorism and its
response, a few preliminary observations can be made. A feminist
approach undoubtedly requires combating impunity for gender-based
harms and terrorist targeting of women, but the key question is how to
develop effective gender-sensitive prevention and response
frameworks without unduly trading in images of women’s
vulnerability and victimhood. Some measures that could be utilized to
identify and address the full range of these impacts—beyond just a
focus on sexual violence—include collecting “gender-disaggregated
data on terrorist violence” and training security officials on how to
recognize these various impacts of terrorism and to deliver gender and
human rights-sensitive security services, as well as including women
and women’s survivor networks in victim-assistance programs to
address the full range of their protection needs.95 Moving past blanket
portrayals of women as victims also includes addressing gendered
grievances and other reasons that women and girls support violent
extremist groups,96 as well as adopting the kinds of gender-sensitive
disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs necessary
for women and girls who may suffer gender-specific abuse both
as ‘material support’ to terrorism, therefore barring successful asylum claims by women who
have suffered this abuse”); Lama Fakih, Soft Measures, Real Harm: Somalia and the US “War
on Terror,” in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 183 (examining how US anti-terrorism financing policies have
politicized and chilled humanitarian assistance in Somalia, reducing the assistance available
for women and women’s rights organizations and resulting in reliance on groups that are
detrimental to women’s rights); A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 7, at 100 (addressing the application of “material support” bars to
female asylum-seekers); id. at 70–80 (analyzing the gender impacts of US anti-terrorism
financing rules).
95. See, e.g., Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note
53, Good Practice #21.
96. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶12 (urging Member States and requesting
UN entities to “conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers
of radicalization for women” and to “ensure United Nations monitoring and assessment
mechanisms and processes mandated to prevent and respond to violent extremism, which can
be conducive to terrorism, have the necessary gender expertise to fulfil their mandates”); Good
Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good Practices #2, #8,
#9; PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra note 61,
at 231 (recommending that Member States, the United Nations, regional organizations and
civil society should “[i]nvest in research and data collection on women’s roles in terrorism
including identifying the drivers that lead to their radicalization and involvement with terrorist
groups, and the impacts of counter- terrorism strategies on their lives.”).
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within terrorist groups and from security services.97 The questions
concerning women’s roles as agents in countering terrorism and
violent extremism—and the more expansive question of the
relationship between gender equality and national security—are
particularly complex and are explored in more detail below.98 A more
nuanced account of gender and victimhood in the post-9/11 era also
necessarily involves preventing, identifying, and remedying a series
of adverse gender and human rights impacts of those measures taken
in furtherance of national security agendas; an issue to which this
Article now turns in more detail.99
B. Formalism and Inattentiveness to Gender-Based National Security
Violations
As has been observed in some feminist legal analyses, an initial
effect of the post-9/11 “War on Terror” was to revive formalist and
State-centric100 approaches to international law in order to underscore
its legitimacy.101 In this immediate post-9/11 moment, international
law’s reinvigorated formalism had a number of adverse gender
impacts that have subsequently narrowed the capacity of international
97. Good Practices on Women and Countering Violent Extremism, supra note 53, Good
Practice #10; PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra
note 61, at 231 (recommending that Member States and the United Nations should “[d]evelop
gender-sensitive disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes that address the
specific needs of women and girls.”); Jayne Huckerby, Gender, Violent Extremism, and
Terrorism, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 3, 2015).
98. See infra notes 136-96 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra
note 7, at 112-14 (outlining a series of tools for undertaking gender-sensitive measurement and
monitoring of the gender and human rights dimensions and impacts of activities to counter
terrorism and violent extremism); S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, at ¶12 (urging Member States
and requesting United Nations entities “to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and
data collection on the . . . impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights
and women’s organizations”); PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING
THE PEACE, supra note 61, at 231 (calling for “gender-sensitive monitoring and evaluation of
all counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism interventions. . .including through use
of gender-related indicators and collection of sex-disaggregated data.”).
100. See Heathcote, supra note 7, at 299 (“The assertion of a mainstream (or formalist)
return to the key values of the UN Charter, or international law, leaves little space for feminist
approaches to international law that are premised on the possibility of re-imagining
international law’s core.”).
101. See, e.g., Karima Bennoune, Remembering the Other’s Others: Theorizing the
Approach of International Law to Muslim Fundamentalism, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
635 (2010) [hereinafter Remembering the Other’s Others]; Anne Orford, The Destiny of
International Law, 17 LEIDEN J. of INT’L L. 441 (2004); Heathcote, supra note 7, at 300.
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law to develop gender norms. The first of these was to emphasize
those State-centric102 approaches to international law that traditionally
valorized public spaces and excluded women’s experience in the
private sphere, resulting in insufficient attention to private actors.103
The second was to show, however, that alongside such State-centric
approaches, international law did actually also have the capacity to
address non-State actors—by galvanizing a serious and full-scale
international law response to abuses by terrorists—but that it would
also be selective as to when it chose to recalibrate the rigidity of this
public/private divide in international law. While States were disposed
to “far-reaching analyses of state responsibility doctrines” to hold
States (e.g., so-called State sponsors of terrorism) responsible for the
conduct of terrorist actors,104 the same could not be said of the
willingness of States to enhance state responsibility doctrines when it
concerned other forms of violence by non-State actors (e.g., domestic
violence against women).105 This impartial convergence of feminist
102. See Heathcote, supra note 7, at 299 (“The assertion of a mainstream (or formalist)
return to the key values of the UN Charter, or international law, leaves little space for feminist
approaches to international law that are premised on the possibility of re-imagining
international law’s core.”). A similar observation concerning the State-centric nature of
responses to terrorism has been made in feminist engagements with critical terrorism studies
and international security: see, e.g., Parashar & Sylvester, supra note 13; Parashar, supra note
13.
103. See Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 625–27
(addressing the gendered dimensions of the public/private divide in international law);
Feminist Methods in International Law, supra note 16, at 387–88 (arguing that the
public/private divide of State/non-State actors in international law reinforces gender
inequality); Johnstone, supra note 7, at 4–7 (tracing manifestations of the public/private divide
in international law, particularly with regard to State/non-State actors and the
international/internal dichotomy). For feminist legal critiques of the public/private distinction
as it manifests in relation to international human rights law, see, e.g., Anne Orford, Contesting
Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT’L. L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1712, 1715 (1998) (“[I]nternational human rights law regime that
developed after 1945 . . . treats the state as the principal threat to the freedom of the individual,
human dignity, and human well-being.”). See generally Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the
Public/ Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY:
WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Celina Romany,
Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International
Human Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (1993).
104. Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1099.
105. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 7, at 1–2 (citations omitted) (comparing “the
configuration of acts and actors of September 11, 2001” and “men’s violence against women”
and noting that the “formal and substantive parallels between the two—prominently their
horizontal legal architecture, large victim numbers, and masculine ideology—make both
patterns of violence resemble dispersed armed conflict, but the world’s response to them has
been inconsistent”); see also Johnstone, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that states broke down
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theory and counter-terrorism106 was an early shot across the bow to
feminist approaches that saw opportunities for positive transformation
in international law in the wake of 9/11.
The third formalist effect derived from State behavior itself as
the “War on Terror” continued beyond its initial moment. In
particular, increased violations in the name of countering terrorism
that targeted men and boys through actions such as torture, arbitrary
detention, and denial of the right to life signified a return to the kinds
of violations with which international human rights law had been
most traditionally concerned: men as victims of the State’s civil and
political rights violations.107 Efforts of the human rights community to
address such violations, including, for example, detention and torture
at Guantánamo Bay108 further entrenched this focus. A series of
distinct and adverse gender effects flowed from this focus on State
violations of men’s rights. For example, it has been argued—
particularly through those feminist perspectives that challenge
“Muslim fundamentalism”—that this focus on male alleged terrorists
as victims deprioritized women’s experience of terrorism and stymied
the ability of international law to develop an adequate account of
“Muslim fundamentalism” and its impact on women.109 Additionally,
the rehashing of traditional and overly legalistic and highly technical
arguments over whether certain activities (e.g., waterboarding) fit
some aspects of the public/private divide at the same time as reifying others such as “the nonrecognition of ‘enemy combatants’ as state organs or agents; privatization of military and nonmilitary operations during the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq; the privatization of gender
discrimination in state (re-)building; and reinforcement of gender stereotypes and women’s
private roles in the ‘War on Terror’”).
106. See, e.g., Johnstone, supra note 7, at 3; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1100, 1101.
107. See Brooks, supra note 16, at 345–47; Feminist Approaches to International Law,
supra note 16, at 627–28 (noting, for example, the use of only the masculine pronoun in the
definition of torture, as a way to illustrate how the public/private dichotomy is pervasive in
international law and succeeds in excluding women’s voices).
108. See Meredith Tax, Women Have Rights Too, GUARDIAN (Dec. 13, 2010), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/dec/13/international-criminal-courtmoreno-ocampo (“But the ‘war on terror’ has returned us, in many ways, to status quo ante:
today, the normative human rights victim is once more a male prisoner, this time in
Guantánamo; human rights offences by states are back at centre stage; and crimes against
women and children are again being marginalised”).
109. See Karima Bennoune, Terror/Torture, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 40 (2008)
[hereinafter Terror/Torture] (“The human rights community, as a matter of basic principles of
human rights, must hear (and respond to) the voices of victims of terrorism, their survivors,
and all those who live in fear of such violence—just as it hears and responds to the voices of
victims of counter-terror, their survivors and all those who live in fear of that violence. . . .”);
Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101.
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within international law’s definition of torture, sidelined
developments in progressive interpretations of international law that
sought to categorize—and elevate—private abuses of women’s rights
(e.g., domestic violence) as State violations of torture norms.110
Moreover, this formalism and attention to States’ male victims also
lay the groundwork for another significant normative silence in the
area of gender norms that has hitherto been insufficiently addressed
by feminist approaches to international law: State violations of
women’s rights and gender equality in counter-terrorism efforts.111
Indeed, the focus on women’s victimhood at the hands of
terrorists discussed above, along with a formalist impulse to address
only men as victims of counter-terrorism, created the perfect storm
for silence on State violations of women’s rights and gender equality
in counter-terrorism efforts. Remarkably, it was not until 2009—eight
years removed from the events of 9/11—that the adverse gender
impacts of counter-terrorism were first catalogued at the international
level through a report to the UN General Assembly by the UN Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.112 The report
110. See Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101, at 659–60, 698; see also
Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture,
25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 337 (1993-1994) (arguing that in certain circumstances
domestic violence should be recognized as torture); Heathcote, supra note 7, at 297
(“[S]ubversive feminist accounts in response to the global war against terrorism, alongside
other critical and/or subversive approaches, became difficult to articulate when the dominant
Western narrative appeared to function to reject international legal norms.”); id. at 300 (noting
the subsequent exclusion of “feminists, women, critical theorists, writers from the global
south, postcolonial theorists and third world approaches”).
111. See A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra
note 7, at 9 (“Over the last decade of the United States’ ‘War on Terror,’ the oft-unspoken
assumption that men suffer the most—both numerically and in terms of the nature of rights
violations endured—has obscured the way women and sexual minorities experience counterterrorism, rendering their rights violations invisible to policymakers and the human rights
community alike.”); Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1121 (reflecting on the need to “pay[] close
attention to the experiences of women as the subjects of counterterrorism norms underscores
the unique vulnerabilities that women face when their lives intersect with powerful patriarchal
institutions and interests”).
112. See generally U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93. The author was involved in the
research and writing of this report. For earlier consideration by the UN Special Rapporteur of
the gender dimensions and impacts of counter-terrorism, see Promotion and Protection of All
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to
Development, ¶¶ 21, 38, 62–63, 73(c), Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/6/17
(discussing the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism); UN Secretary-General, Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/62/263 (Aug. 15, 2007); Special
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builds upon earlier work of the UN Special Rapporteur to provide a
“comprehensive overview of the frequency and nature of genderbased human rights abuses in counter-terrorism measures and to
explore the complex relationship between gender equality and
countering terrorism.”113 Significantly, the report, following on the
mandate’s instruction to “integrate a gender perspective,” reflects a
social definition of gender as distinguished from the biological
definition of sex and therefore discusses, besides the human rights of
women, the gendered impact of counter-terrorism measures on men
and persons of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities, and
addresses how gender intersects with other prohibited grounds of
discrimination, such as race and religion.114 The use of this gender
lens means that the report, while predominantly focused on women’s
experiences, highlights the gender performativity at stake in
additional areas, including the use of interrogation techniques against
male terrorist suspects in detention facilities,115 as well as ways in
which governments use the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and intersex individuals as bartering tools to appease
terrorist groups.116 The reaction to the report amongst a number of
States and some conservative non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), however, teetered on vitriolic and hyperbolic, with many
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while
countering terrorism, Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 60/251 of 15 March
2006 Entitled “Human Rights Council”, ¶¶ 72, 92, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/26. For subsequent documentation of the gender and human rights impacts of
counter-terrorism, including those particularly focusing on the post-9/11 era, see Phumzile
Mlambo-Ngcuka & Radhika Coomaraswamy, Women are the Best Weapon in the War Against
Terrorism, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/10/women-arethe-best-weapon-in-the-war-against-terrorism/ (“Militarized counterterrorism operations
disrupt economic and social activity, and destroy civilian infrastructure—the schools, markets,
and medical facilities relied on by women in traditional caring roles.”). See generally GENDER,
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 4; A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7;
Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4.
113. U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 19.
114. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20 (quoting another source); see also Dianne Otto, Transnational HomoAssemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism Discourses, 4 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV.
79, 82 (2013) (analyzing the use of a gender lens in the report).
115. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 44; see also Timothy Kaufman-Osborn,
Gender Trouble at Abu Ghraib?, 1 POLS. & GENDER 597 (2005); (EN)GENDERING THE WAR
ON TERROR: WAR STORIES AND CAMOUFLAGED POLITICS (Krista Hunt & Kim Rygiel eds.,
2007); ONE OF THE GUYS: WOMEN AS AGGRESSORS AND TORTURERS (Tara McKelvey ed.,
2007).
116. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 36.
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challenging the use of a social (versus a biological) definition of
gender and the report’s consideration of sexual orientation and gender
identity.117 In an unusual step demonstrative of the extent of this
negative reaction, the UN General Assembly deleted references to the
report from its annual resolution on human rights and counterterrorism.118
The report was significant, not only as the first global—albeit
belated—account of gender-based violations in the name of national
security, but also because its reaction is a litmus test of the capacity of
international law to advance gender norms in an overarching national
security environment in five key ways. The first is that it evinces a
new testing of the public/private divide in international law, on the
one hand reflecting the reticence of governments to acknowledge that
State counter-terrorism measures—inadvertently or otherwise—could
adversely impact women, but on the other, showing its willingness to
invest in addressing violence against women by terrorist actors. This
constitutes a reversal of the usual complaint of feminist approaches to
international law, i.e., that States focus disproportionately on public
violence at the expense of that in the private spheres. In large part,
this reversal can be attributed to the ongoing influence of national
security discourses that, in the immediate to mid-range aftermath of
9/11, still utilized or relied upon a model of the State as the savior of
women who are victims of terrorist savages.119 Under this binary
model, it was simply not possible for many international stakeholders
to contemplate the State as a violator of women’s rights;
demonstrating that “beyond the language of victimhood and defense

117. See, e.g., Political Affairs Head Says UN Efforts to Assist Election in ‘High
Demand’ as Third Committee’s Debate on Promotion of Human Rights Continue, U.N. Doc.
GA/SHC/3959 (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gashc3959.doc.htm;
see also Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism
Discourses, supra note 114, at 85 (“Endorsement of the report came from states in the Western
European and Other Group (WEOG) and the Latin American Group, many of whom
performed their gay-friendliness by making a point of showing their familiarity and ease with
using the identity categories of sexual and gender minorities.”).
118. See G.A. Res. 64/168 (Dec. 18, 2009). For the votes, see Overview of the 64th
Session of the General Assembly, INT’L SERV. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 4 n.13 (2010), http://
www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/hrm_2009_general_assembly_forweb_0.pdf.
119. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. See generally Makua Mutua, Savages,
Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 201 (2001).
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of the female, there is little political room for a full engagement with
sex, sexism, and gender intricacies in the counterterrorism terrain.”120
Secondly, to some extent, the reaction to the report also provides
insights into the ongoing challenges in the gender/sex debate under
international law. Feminist approaches to international law have
largely preferred the use of the social category of gender to fully
extrapolate an understanding of international rules and their effects.121
The use of a gender lens has been similarly critical in feminist
critiques of the fields of international relations and security studies
that have challenged the often-interchangeable use of “gender” and
“sex” and applied the social definition of gender.122 However, the
categories of gender and sex have been contested ones in international
law’s discourse and practice, with some States continuing to prefer
the use of a narrower, biological category of sex centered on the
traditional male/female binary, rather than a broader definition of
gender as a social construct that includes, for example, engagement in
a discussion of masculinities, femininities, and gender identity and
sexual orientation.123 At the same time, however, “more recent
international law efforts have shifted toward a focus on gender and
sexuality,”124 such that many of the core concepts in the report—the
use of a social definition of gender that also addresses sexual
120. Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1116–17 (citations omitted) (noting that “[t]he limits of
progressive equality briefing in the context of counterterrorism policy are poignantly proven
by the Special Rapporteur’s decision in 2009 to go beyond reporting on harms to women. . . .
The Report garnered tremendously negative political responses by a variety of states. . . . The
conclusion one can draw is awkward. A gendered account of counterterrorism strategies that
concentrates on female harm can carve out acceptable political space. But beyond the language
of victimhood and defense of the female, there is little political room for a full engagement
with sex, sexism, and gender intricacies in the counterterrorism terrain.”).
121. Feminist Methods in International Law, supra note 16, at 379 (“Feminist methods
. . . insist on the importance of gender relations as a category of analysis. The term ‘gender’
here refers to the social construction of differences between women and men and ideas of
‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’—the excess cultural baggage associated with biological sex.”).
122. See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 13, at 158 (“including women as a category of
identity within security discourse without also integrating gender as unit of analysis creates
silences”); Tickner, supra note 13, at 336 (defining gender as “a set of variable, but socially
and culturally constructed relational characteristics” and analyzing the post-9/11 moment
through a gender lens).
123. See generally Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender
Mainstreaming and Human Rights in the United Nations, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 14–18
(2005) (outlining the sex/gender distinction in international law and arguing that it is elided in
the context of gender mainstreaming where gender is synonymous with women).
124. Darren Rosenblum, Unsex CEDAW, or What’s Wrong With Women’s Rights, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98, 101 (2011).
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orientation and gender identity, as well as the need to address women
in various capacities (e.g., as victims, perpetrators, and agents of
change)—have strong and long antecedents in other areas of
international human rights law and practice.125 Against this normative
backdrop, the furor over the report’s use of a social definition of
gender then looks more like a smokescreen than substantive concern,
requiring that other explanations for the nature of the reaction be
explored. The third insight provided by the report’s reaction
therefore—particularly given the perspective of those States and some
NGOs who objected to the report interpreting “gender perspective” to
incorporate sexual orientation and gender identity—regards the
ongoing, significant challenges in the “project of queering
international law.”126 As such, it also highlights some of the
inclusivity challenges in feminist approaches to international law,
whereby some feminist advocates are reticent to advance the rights of
those of diverse sexual orientation and gender identities on the basis
that it could undermine women’s rights claims.127
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the reaction to the report
is instructive on the project of gender mainstreaming and, in
particular, the very limited ability of international norms on gender to
traverse different areas of international rule-making and
implementation. The report’s use of a social definition of gender is
one that has been adopted elsewhere in international human rights
law, including by other UN Special Rapporteurs and women-specific
institutions without fanfare.128 As such it is very difficult to escape the
conclusion that a core cause of consternation was that the concepts
were being applied by a non-gender-specific part of the United
125. A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at 120–21 (citations omitted) (identifying
the different usages of “gender,” and noting that “[b]y the mid-1990s, the official definition of
‘gender’ in the U.N. system had become a version of gender as a social category, although the
biological version was retained in the term ‘sex’”).
126. Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading ‘Gender’ in Counter-terrorism
Discourses, supra note 114, at 85–86.
127. See id. at 91–94.
128. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
General Recommendation No. 25, on Article 4, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, on Temporary Special Measures,
n.2 reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004) (quoting 1999 World
Survey on the Role of Women in Development, United Nations, New York, 1999, ix)
(“Gender is defined as the social meanings given to biological sex differences . . . Thus, gender
is a social stratifier. . . It helps us understand the social construction of gender identities and
the unequal structure of power that underlies the relationship between the sexes.”).
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Nation’s institutional machinery (the UN Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
while countering terrorism) in a report to a non-human rights body
(the UN General Assembly). It, therefore, serves as an indictment of
the ability of the category of “gender” to travel beyond womenspecific institutions (e.g., the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination of Women) or issues traditionally associated with
women (e.g., gender-based violence) to have transformative effects in
core areas of governance, such as national security policy-making and
implementation. Relatedly, subsequent revelations about the intent of
the Egyptian government to dispute the report to discredit the UN
Special Rapporteur in advance of an upcoming country visit to Egypt,
further highlight the fragility of norms on gender equality in the face
of broader political agendas, as well as these norms’ permeability in a
post-9/11 era, where governments regularly prioritize resisting
scrutiny of their human rights record in countering terrorism above
other issues of human rights concern.129
Instead of a feminist approach that ignores or downplays genderbased violations in counter-terrorism and countering violent
extremism, however, there is a tripartite typology that can—and
should—be developed to address State-based harms toward women
and girls in the name of national security. Such a typology would
necessarily reflect an intersectional approach, recognizing how these
gendered experiences are often shaped by a number of other factors,
including, in many contexts, the disproportionate impacts on Muslim
communities of national security policies in the post-9/11 era. The
first aspect of this typology is to appreciate how such policies have
undermined the rights of women and girls through their focus on men
and boys as the subject of counter-terrorism interventions. For
example, the development-security nexus under wider, holistic
approaches to countering violent extremism that focuses on providing
development assistance (e.g., livelihood opportunities) to those most
at risk of “radicalization” in a particular community—primarily men
and young boys—reallocates resources in ways that risk further
marginalization of women and girls who often face more acute

129. See Martin Scheinin, Foreword, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTERTERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at xi, xiv.
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development needs in their community.130 Another example of this
category of violations is when female family members of those
directly impacted by national security measures—such as torture,
disappearance, illegal detention, and killings in the context of
countering terrorism—experience adverse primary and collateral
consequences (e.g., economic rights deprivations).131 Secondly,
governments’ national security policies and practices have also, in
many cases, directly discriminated against women and women’s
rights organizations. For example, some governments have penalized
freedom of expression and association through the use of counterterrorism measures to improperly surveil and suppress activities of
women’s human rights defenders.132 In other cases, governments have
detained or interrogated female relatives of terrorists or violent
extremists who themselves have no purported connection to terrorism
or violent extremism as a form of leverage over their male
relatives.133 Finally, national security policy and practice can result in
discriminatory treatment because of a failure to consider the
underlying gender dynamics in the operating environments in which
measures are being implemented. For example, while anti-terrorism
financing and material support rules and policies are ostensibly
gender-neutral, in practice they can often be gender discriminatory.134
Such counter-terrorism financing rules by their nature favor large,
well-known organizations and require strict reporting and auditing
requirements, whereas, in practice, women’s organizations are small,
130. See, e.g., A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM,
supra note 7, at 30–53 (addressing the gender impacts of development activities to counter
terrorism and violent extremism).
131. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 30 (citations omitted) (detailing gender
impacts of enforced disappearances of male detainees); A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER
IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7, at 54–69 (addressing gender impacts of
militarized counter-terrorism, including on female family members); id. at 81–96 (addressing
gender impacts of intelligence and law enforcement measures, including on female family
members); Ramzi Kassem, Gendered Erasure in the Global “War on Terror”: An Unmasked
Interrogation, in GENDER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN
RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 15, 17 (“Although it has been largely invisible, ‘War
on Terror’ rendition, interrogation, and detention practices that ensnare men have a concrete
and indisputable impact on women, especially spouses.”).
132. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 27.
133. See id. ¶ 31.
134. See, e.g., id. ¶ 42; A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 7, at 70–80; Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the
Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, WOMEN PEACEMAKERS
PROGRAM (2015), https://www.womenpeacemakersprogram.org/assets/CMS/Resources/Repor
ts/Policy-brief-CTM.pdf.
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informal, may need to operate below the radar due to local safety
concerns, and often do not have the administrative infrastructure
necessary to comply with these reporting and auditing
requirements.135
C. Which Women’s Rights Count and How: The Conjoining of
Feminism and National Security
Another key normative consequence of the post-9/11 context is
that it is women’s rights with a national security nexus that have
gained the most traction in international law and the attention of its
institutions. This conjoining of women’s rights and national security
agendas was an immediate feature of the 9/11 response,136 but its
presence and role in countering terrorism and violent extremism has
subsequently evolved and requires separate and more detailed
attention in feminist approaches to international law. This evolution
can be observed in at least four distinct, but related steps in unfolding
national security practice, which I detail in roughly sequential order,
before reflecting on the implications of these developments for
determining not only which rights count, but also how they are
normatively defined. In this account, I also seek to be explicit about
whose rights are being elevated and which feminist interpretations of
international law feature at each stage of the conjoining.
The first stage in the conjoining, as referenced above, was in the
initial call in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to rescue Afghan
women as part of the public push to justify the launch of Operation
Enduring Freedom against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.137
Feminist critiques of the consequences of this invocation of women’s
rights have aptly identified the moral and strategic cover it sought to
provide for military action in response to the events of 9/11, as well as
its adverse gender impacts (such as the silencing of voices of Afghan
women).138
The next stage in the evolution of national security practice is
that specific instances of women’s rights violations also became
defined as national security threats. Perhaps the earliest and most
135. See, e.g., A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM,
supra note 7, at 70–80; Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the Implementation of
the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, supra note 134.
136. See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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prominent example of this concerns trafficking in persons, where in
the post-9/11 environment, the United States and other governments
began to identify linkages between terrorism and trafficking,
focusing, for example, on trafficking and terrorism’s shared character
as transborder threats, the contribution of trafficking to terrorist
mobility, and the role of trafficking in creating unstable nations.139 As
a consequence of these purported linkages, governments also began to
identify how counter-terrorism strategies should encompass efforts
aimed at the eradication of trafficking in persons, calling, for
example, for securitized borders as a policy response to both
phenomena.140 Significantly for feminist analyses of international law,
this post-9/11 merging of the anti-trafficking and anti-terrorism
agendas was not ideology-free. Instead, it centered a certain Western
feminist and abolitionist perspective that favored criminalized and
securitized responses to saving vulnerable Global South women from
the scourge of sex trafficking, rather than addressing, for example,
labor trafficking or domestic trafficking or utilizing labor, human
rights, or migration frameworks.141
The next—and most marked—opportunity for the uptake of
some women’s rights concerns in national security came with the
expansion of national security policy and practice toward a whole-ofgovernment approach that mobilized areas such as development,
human rights, and rule of law, particularly from 2006 onward when
the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted.142 The
adoption of the Strategy was itself in part an attempt to correct the
UN response to terrorism up until that point, which had been very
much driven by the UN Security Council and predominantly limited

139. See Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, supra note 40.
140. See id.; see also U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, ¶ 51.
141. See generally Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, supra note 40. The
influence of this perspective can be most starkly observed, for example, in December 2002,
when President George W. Bush signed his first National Security Presidential Directive 22
(NSPD-22) entitled “Combatting Trafficking in Persons.” Emphasizing the “transnational
threat” posed by trafficking, NSPD-22 specifically states that US anti-trafficking policy is
“based on an abolitionist approach to trafficking in persons. . . . In this regard, the United
States Government opposes prostitution and any related activities . . . . These activities are
inherently harmful and dehumanizing. The United States Government’s position is that these
activities should not be regulated as a legitimate form of work for any human being.” See Nat’l
Sec. Presidential Directive, Combating Trafficking in Persons, NSPD 22, 64–65 (Dec. 16,
2002).
142. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4.

2016]

FEMINISM IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

571

to traditional security measures.143 Accordingly, it contains four
pillars that represent a mixture of “hard” and “soft” approaches:
tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
preventing and combating terrorism; building States’ capacity to
prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the UN
system in that respect; and ensuring respect for human rights for all
and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against
terrorism.144 Subsequent domestic practice emulates and builds upon
this more holistic approach to countering terrorism and violent
extremism, which is also referred to as “preventing violent
extremism” (“PVE”) in some specific domestic contexts.145
143. See UN Counterterrorism Framework: Key Programs and Tools, CHARITY & SEC.
NETWORK (May 1, 2013), http://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/UN_Counterterrorism_
Framework_Key_Programs_and_Tools (“After 9/11, many UN members expressed concern
that the Security Council led counterterrorism framework was usurping the authority of the
General Assembly and largely limiting its focus to security measures. In response, the General
Assembly voted unanimously in September 2006 to adopt the UN Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy (Strategy), which advances a more holistic approach than the Security Council
regime.”). In April 2005, in another nod to the importance of human rights, the then-United
Nations Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 2005/80 decided to appoint, for a
period of three years, a UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. See Off. of the Comm’r on
Human Rights, ¶ 14, Human Rights Res. 2005/80, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Res/2005/80 (Apr. 21,
2005). This mandate was subsequently assumed by the UN Human Rights Council in Apr. 3,
2006, and extended for one year, subject to the review to be undertaken by the Council in
Human Rights Council decision 2006/102 (June 30, 2006). The UN Human Rights Council
extended the mandate for a period of three years by Human Rights Council Res. 15/15, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/Res15/15 (Sept. 30, 2010), and further extended for another period of three years
by Human Rights Council Res. 22/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/22/8 (Mar. 21, 2013). To some
extent this move toward more holistic approaches also derived from advocacy efforts with the
human rights community itself: in the face of increasing violations of human rights in
individual practices, as well as an overarching marginalization of human rights law and
discourse, many in the human rights community directed efforts in the aftermath of 9/11
toward trying to have human rights respected and ensured in the fight against terrorism.
144. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 4.
145. In the US government, CVE has both a domestic and international component. See
Fact Sheet, supra note 73; THE WHITE HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) (detailing the first US plan to counter
violent extremism domestically); Programs and Initiatives, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.
state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#CVE (last visited Jan. 17, 2016) (“CVE is a pillar of the
Administration’s strategic approach to counterterrorism.”). In the United Kingdom, in July
2011, the government published the third version of its counter-terrorism strategy
(CONTEST), which consists of four strands: Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. See
generally SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT, PREVENT STRATEGY, 2011,
Cm. 8092, (U.K.). According to the four-year Prevent strategy also released in 2011, Prevent
seeks “to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism” and has three objectives:
“respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who
promote it; prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given
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In particular, the new field of countering violent extremism
means that national security practice began to “mov[e] further
upstream to address root causes of extremist violence,”146 increasingly
touching and seeking to subsume traditionally feminized areas of
practice or sectors where women have had critical roles, such as in
highly localized and informal efforts to ensure peace or to build
community resilience or in the development of cooperative and trustbased relationships between security institutions and civil society.147
The field of countering violent extremism is also often styled as a
long-term effort to address terrorism and violent extremism in
contrast to States’ initial focus in the aftermath of 9/11 on the
immediate tasks of enhancing capacity and undertaking measures in
the areas of law enforcement, investigation, and prosecution.148 This
widening of the understanding of what constitutes national security
policy and practice, as well as the emphasis on developing preventive,
long-term, local, and context-specific strategic approaches,149
notionally created greater space for the incorporation of women’s
rights issues, as well as greater attention to promoting women’s
participation, including in their families, communities, educational
institutions, and public sector. Additionally, as discussed above, under
these more holistic approaches, contemporary national security
practices have also increasingly stressed the need to counteract the
dehumanization of victims of terrorism.150 This focus on victims has
provided an additional key opportunity for incorporation of those
appropriate advice and support; and work with a wide range of sectors and institutions . . .
where there are risks of radicalisation. . . .” See id. at 6, 40.
146. Holmer, supra note 12, at 2.
147. See id. and supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text; see also Good
Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter
Violent Extremism, supra note 12, at 4 (Good Practice 5). The OSCE has similarly produced
detailed guidance on this mainstreaming of gender and the inclusion of women in community
policing as a CVE tool. See PREVENTING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM: A COMMUNITY-POLICING
APPROACH, supra note 72, at 142–45.
148. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/68/841, supra note 6, ¶ 20.
149. See, e.g., Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented
Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism, supra note 12, at 1 (“[L]ocally-relevant CVE
initiatives are central to the success of any strategy.”); Fact Sheet, supra note 73 (“The
underlying premise of the approach to countering violent extremism in the United States is that
(1) communities provide the solution to violent extremism; and (2) CVE efforts are best
pursued at the local level, tailored to local dynamics, where local officials continue to build
relationships within their communities through established community policing and
community outreach mechanisms.”).
150. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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feminist perspectives—particularly of those feminists opposing
“Muslim fundamentalism”151—that stress the pervasiveness of
terrorist violence against women and define addressing such violence
as a core component of counter-terrorism, and indeed international
law more broadly.
In particular, women, peace, and security issues, and the
participation of women peace-builders have been given heightened
attention within this broader and more localized approach to
countering terrorism and violent extremism.152 This conjoining
derives in large part from the understanding of the close nexus
between conflict and terrorism in contemporary national security
discourse and practice. As reflected in early feminist accounts, initial
State responses in the immediate aftermath of the events of 9/11
unequivocally placed both terrorism and counter-terrorism within a
conflict paradigm, leading to the preference for a militarized
responses to terrorism, rather than alternate approaches that
emphasized law enforcement and/or human rights. While thinking
and practice on the conflict-terrorism nexus has evolved and become
somewhat more nuanced in the intervening years,153 there is still a
strong commitment to addressing the “peace and security dimensions
of counter-terrorism,”154 particularly through activities addressed at
conflict resolution and prevention under Pillar I of the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy,155 as well as through the promotion of
151. See, e.g., Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101; Terror/Torture, supra
note 109.
152. See generally Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4 (identifying a series of
convergences between “international conflict feminism” and counter-terrorism discourse and
practice).
153. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 2195, preambular ¶ 16 (Dec. 19, 2014) (“Emphasizing that the
combined presence of terrorism, violent extremism, and transnational organized crime may
exacerbate conflicts in affected regions . . . and noting that terrorist groups benefiting from
transnational organized crime can, in some cases and in some regions, complicate conflict
prevention and resolution efforts.”); U.N. Doc. A/68/841, supra note 6, ¶ 21 (“Terrorism is
increasingly a factor in areas of conflict, and awareness of the Strategy and an understanding
of terrorism are especially important for peacekeeping, special political and other United
Nations support missions in conflict and post-conflict environments where terrorism and
terrorist tactics remain evident.”).
154. U.N. Doc. A/68/841, supra note 6, ¶ 22.
155. Id. ¶¶ 22, 27, 34, 36-37, 47 (noting that under Pillar I’s focus on “[p]reventing and
resolving conflicts” there are a number of activities that seek to address the intersections of
peace and security with counter-terrorism and CVE, including “strengthening fragile
democratic transitions and transforming confrontation into dialogue”; enhancing “national
capacities for conflict prevention to strengthen the resilience of societies”; utilizing
“systematic conflict analysis” to “inform the design and execution of preventive measures to
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human rights under its Pillar IV.156 In addition to the opportunities for
overlap deriving from States’ ongoing attachment to the conflictterrorism nexus, such a conjoining was facilitated by the parallel
ascendancy of the women, peace, and security agenda at the UN
Security Council from 2000 onward.157 The fact that “international
conflict feminism” and counter-terrorism share both a “security
paradigm” and “rule of law framework,” has meant that such an
ascendancy of “international conflict feminism” was readily “allied
not only with intervention, but also the post-intervention push for
nation-building institutional arrangements that pay homage to the
intervening powers and/or serve their interests.”158 Additionally, as
has been noted in some feminist engagement with security studies and
particularly the concept of “human security,” the traction gained by
the women, peace, and security agenda owes much to the salience of
the human security framework which informed and then subsequently
securitized the agenda, as well as women and women’s issues more
broadly.159 Accordingly, in the immediate post-9/11 environment, it
was those women’s organizations that were “already oriented toward
security”—including because of their work on the women, peace, and
security agenda—that had the opportunity to become more prominent
than other women’s groups.160 This trend toward overlapping of
counter the emergence of radicalization and violent extremism”; and giving peace operations
“disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation mandates where the armed groups to enter the
programmes sometimes have terrorist links”).
156. Id. ¶ 22.
157. Additionally this conjoining is facilitated by the prevention pillar of UNSCR 1325,
pursuant to which one of the four goals or outcomes is that “[i]nternational, national and nonState security actors are responsive to and held to account for any violations of the rights of
women and girls, in line with international standards.” See UN Secretary-General, Women and
Peace and Security, at annex 35, U.N. Doc. S/2010/498 (Sept. 28, 2010). There are three
indicators for voluntary reporting by Member States to meet this goal. See id. (“Percentage of
reported cases of sexual exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by uniformed, civilian
peacekeepers and/or humanitarian workers that are acted upon out of the total number of
referred cases.”); id. at 36 (“Extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human
rights are included in directives issued by heads of military components and heads of police
components of peacekeeping missions.”). Indicator 5(b) specifically refers to national security.
See id. (“Extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human rights are included in
national security policy frameworks).
158. Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4, at 133.
159. See generally NATALIE FLOREA HUDSON, GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE
UNITED NATIONS: SECURITY LANGUAGE AS A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR WOMEN (2010)
[hereinafter GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS].
160. See Julie Mertus, Road Blocks, Blind Spots, Speed Bumps: A Feminist Look at the
Post-9/11 Landscape for NGOs, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BETWEEN RESISTANCE AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 7, at 98, 103.
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women, peace, and security and counter-terrorism was formally
addressed by the UN Security Council in October 2013 when it
explicitly conjoined actions pursuant to UNSCR 1325 with counterterrorism efforts in its UNSCR 2122, which expressed its intention to
incorporate women, peace, and security issues in all relevant thematic
areas of work on its agenda, including in threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts.161 This conjoining then spurred a
series of institutional acknowledgements of the overlap within the UN
Security Council,162 UN General Assembly,163 and UN Human Rights
Council,164 which have also stressed the need for women’s
participation as a core component of efforts to counter terrorism and
violent extremism. Very occasionally, women, peace, and security
issues—particularly those concerning violations of women’s rights
and sexual violence—have also been integrated into counter-terrorism
sanctions regimes.165
Finally, it has been increasingly and more recently argued that
gender inequality and/or women’s insecurity writ large—as opposed
to specific violations of rights as in the case of trafficking in persons
or of women’s rights under the Taliban in Afghanistan—is a threat to
national security, such that the promotion of gender equality should
itself be considered a counter-terrorism measure.166 This approach
recasts “feminism” as a counter-terrorism strategy.167 It is most
readily encapsulated in the emphasis on women’s rights promotion as
not just being the “right” thing to do, but also the “smart” thing from
161. S.C. Res. 2122, supra note 33, ¶ 3.
162. S.C. Res. 2178 supra note 12, ¶ 16; S.C. Res. 2195, supra note 153, preambular ¶
14; S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶ 11; S.C. Res. 2250 ¶ 16 (Dec. 9, 2015). In particular, of
these UN Security Council Resolutions, UNSCR 2242 pays the most detailed attention to the
roles of women in violent extremism and its response, see S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶¶
11-13, and calls for “greater integration” of the women, peace, and security, and counterterrorism and countering violent extremism agendas, see S.C. Res. 2242, supra note 33, ¶ 11.
See also Statement of the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/21 ¶ 11
(Oct. 28, 2014).
163. G.A. Res. 68/276, supra note 4, preambular ¶ 20.
164. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/L.25/Rev.1 ¶ 4 (Oct. 1, 2015).
165. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/2014/693, supra note 53, ¶ 9.
166. See generally Barbara Ehrenreich, A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Feminism, in
STOP THE NEXT WAR NOW: EFFECTIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 78
(Medea Benjamin and Jodie Evans, eds., 2005) (advocating for supporting human rights for
women and girls in order to combat terrorism in areas where “extremist Islamic insurgency” is
prevalent); Terror/Torture, supra note 109, at 49.
167. See, e.g., Ehrenreich, supra note 166, at 78 (“So here in one word is my new
counterterrorism strategy: feminism.”).
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a security perspective, reflecting an instrumentalist approach to
women’s rights advocacy that can be traced to early feminist concerns
about gain reversal in the aftermath of 9/11 and the need to keep
women’s rights, and women, on and at the table.168 This approach is
one particularly championed by Western governments, most ardently
by the United States, and it often draws its support from explicit
reference to the women, peace, and security agenda rather than, for
example, references to human rights obligations concerning women’s
non-discriminatory participation in all forms of public life.169 Indeed,
this particular framing extrapolates from one of the core rationales for
promoting women’s inclusion and gender mainstreaming in peace,
and security more broadly: the idea that “peace is inextricably linked
with equality between men and women.”170 As such, efforts to link
gender equality and countering violent extremism also tend to stress
168. See, e.g., GENDER, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 159,
at 31 (noting that securitization of an issue enables greater allocation of resources).
169. See, e.g., Hearing on Nominations: Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
111th Cong. 2 (2009) (statement of Melanne Verveer, Ambassador-at-Large-Designate for
Global Women’s Issues), http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/VerveerTestimony090324p
.pdf; International Violence Against Women: Stories and Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Human Rights, and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
111th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Melanne Verveer, Ambassador-at-Large, Office of Global
Women’s Issues); Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks at the 10th Anniversary of
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (Oct. 26, 2010), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150010.htm; Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State,
Remarks at the Women in the World Stories and Solutions Summit (Mar. 11, 2011), http://
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/03/158220.htm; Dep’t of State, Fact Sheet: The United
States and UN Security Council Resolution 1325: Promoting the Political Participation of
Women in All Aspects of Peace and Security (Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2010/10/150006.htm; Rahim Kanani, An In-depth Interview with Melanne Verveer, U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2011), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/rahim-kanani/melanee-verveer-us-ambassador-at-large_b_833073.ht
ml; Mark Landler, A New Gender Agenda: Interview with Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Aug. 21, 2009, at MM 41; Juan Lozano, Clinton Champions Women’s Rights Worldwide,
HOUSTON CHRON. (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ metropolitan/634
7110.html; Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent
Extremism (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarkspresident-summit-countering-violent-extremism-february-19-2015 (“And as we go forward,
let’s commit to expanding education, including for girls. Expanding opportunity, including for
women. Nations will not truly succeed without the contributions of their women.”); Press
Release, White House, Fact Sheet: “A Moment of Opportunity” in the Middle East and North
Africa (May 19, 2011), http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/fact-sheetmoment-opportunity-middle-east-and-north-africa; Melanne Verveer, Ambassador-at-Large
for Global Women’s Issues, Women, Peace and Security (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.state.gov/
s/gwi/rls/rem/2011/161196.htm; WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
170. Mlambo-Ngcuka & Coomaraswamy, supra note 112.
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that gender inequality is a sign of at-risk communities, such that it “is
no coincidence that in societies and communities where gender
equality indicators are higher, women are less vulnerable to the
impacts of violent extremism,”171 and to call for women’s
engagement on the basis that “an increase in women empowerment
and gender equality has a positive effect on countering extremism, as
it does similarly in peace building.”172 Feminists opposing “Muslim
fundamentalism” have also again been particularly key allied voices
in this form of conjoining by emphasizing the impact of some terrorist
violence against women, but also the broader need for international
law and lawyers to mobilize a response that fully addresses these
impacts and discontinues its deference to purportedly competing
human rights norms (e.g., the rights of male victims of counterterrorism or of freedom of religion).173
These efforts to converge women’s rights and national security
have had a series of consequences for the international landscape on
gender norms. An account of these impacts necessarily draws on
those rich feminist legal analyses that have queried the normative
damage that is done to women’s rights as it has moved from
international law’s margins to its mainstream, particularly through the
ascendance of women, peace, and security agenda in the UN Security
Council;174 but also in other areas where “governance feminism” has
171. Id. (“Overwhelming evidence from around the world shows that women’s
empowerment is a powerful force for economic growth, social and political stability, and
sustainable peace.”).
172. See Krista London Couture, A Gendered Approach to Countering Violent
Extremism: Lessons Learned from Women in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention Applied
Successfully in Bangladesh and Morocco, FOREIGN POL’Y: BROOKINGS viii (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30-gender-conflict-preventio
n-countering-violent-extremism-couture/women-cve-formatted-72914-couture-final2.pdf. See
further PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra note
61, at 227 (recognizing the link but concluding that “[i]ncreasing recognition of women’s
participation and empowerment should not be part of counter-terrorism strategies but a part of
the civilian peace agenda.”).
173. See, e.g., Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101, at 636; Terror/Torture,
supra note 109; supra note 108 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 34; A Sign of “Weakness”?, supra note 34, at 162
(“If the transformative goals of international women’s peace movements are not being
furthered by the increased participation of women in conflict-related decision-making, then
whose project is being advanced?”); Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on
Gender Issues in International Law over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2009)
[hereinafter The Exile of Inclusion] (analyzing the consequences of the UN Security Council’s
adoption of the women, peace, and security agenda for “the long feminist struggle to utilise
international law to promote and protect women’s rights and gender equality, and to secure
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had traction, such as in the area of international criminal law and sex
trafficking.175 Other areas of feminist inquiry that emphasize the role
of women’s rights in servicing repressive international policy
responses in counter-terrorism and practice176 are also particularly
salient here. Applying these insights illuminates some outcomes for
gender norms and international law in the post-9/11 era as follows.
The first such outcome, as mentioned above, is that the
conjoining has given traction to some areas of protection for women’s
rights and not others. In this respect, it is not a coincidence that two of
the women’s rights issues that have arguably gained most prominence
in the post-9/11 era—the women, peace, and security agenda, and
anti-trafficking efforts—are ones that governments perceived to have
had a national security nexus or at least a very ready overlay with
national security objectives and practices. Significantly, both of these
areas were in nascent stages at the time of the events of 9/11—
UNSCR 1325 had been adopted on October 31, 2000 and the first
comprehensive international anti-trafficking instrument (the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the ‟UN
Trafficking Protocol”)) on November 15, 2000.177 The evolving and
more omnipotent national security environment fundamentally shaped
the norms underpinning these frameworks; for example, I have
detailed elsewhere the impact of this timing and the perceived
trafficking-terror nexus on favoring a securitized rather than human
rights-based approach to trafficking in persons that focused on
enhancing border controls and criminal responses to the phenomenon
of transnational sex trafficking of foreign women.178

peace.”); Power and Danger, supra note 1 (assessing whether the UN Security Council’s
adoption of a series of thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security confirms the
account of “governance feminism”).
175. See, e.g., Halley et al., supra note 2, at 347-60 (addressing governance feminism
and sex trafficking in the 1980s and 1990s).
176. See generally Kapur, supra note 7; Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4;
supra note 38 and accompanying text. For the perspectives of feminist engagements with
security studies see, e.g., ANNICK T. R. WIBBEN, FEMINIST SECURITY STUDIES: A NARRATIVE
APPROACH 84-85 (2011) (arguing of the risk of securitization of areas such as human rights
through the discourse of human security). Cf. Tripp, supra note 13 (arguing that the framework
of human security creates openings for feminist contributions).
177. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 30.
178. See Unpacking the Trafficking-Terror Nexus, supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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However, the women, peace, and security, and anti-trafficking
agendas, have also serviced counter-terrorism and national security
objectives. For example, for many years in the aftermath of 9/11, the
dual rise of the women, peace, and security agenda and counterterrorism discourse and practice worked hand-in-hand to preference
the use of a securitized and conflict-based paradigm (as opposed to a
law enforcement or human rights one) as the core lens through which
to approach pressing issues in global governance. Such securitization
and protectionist approaches required and invest heavily in images of
gendered victimhood,179 which the anti-trafficking and women, peace,
and security regimes also supplied.180 Securitized approaches to these
areas have given staying power to images of women as vulnerable
and requiring of States’ protectionist policies; as such, one core
outcome of situating women’s rights in a national security framework
has been a preference for conflict-based (e.g., in the case of women,
peace, and security) or criminalized (e.g., in the case of trafficking)
responses to issues of concern to women that primarily emphasize
their gendered vulnerability (e.g., as victims of trafficking, terrorism,
and conflict) at the hands of foreign men. To the extent that some
feminist approaches have then dovetailed with national security
agendas and utilized gendered images of vulnerability, this confirms
the propensity of “governance feminism” to promote State-centered,
law and order, or criminalized responses.181
Evolutions in contemporary national security practice toward
more holistic approaches tend to continue these risks of securitization.
While the exact relationship between counter-terrorism and
countering violent extremism is not universally accepted (e.g., some
argue that the latter is a “subset” of counter-terrorism policy and
practice, others argue that it is an “evolution”)182 it is clear that “CVE
emerged from and does, for the most part, remain parked—
programmatically and conceptually—in the international and national
security policymaking community as part of a broader effort to
counter terrorism.”183 The result is that despite its more holistic
character and the emphasis on human rights noted above, the field of
179. See, e.g., Heathcote, supra note 7, at 297.
180. See supra notes 83 and 141 and accompanying text.
181. Halley et al., supra note 2, at 341 (noting that “governance feminism” successes are
“very state-centered, top-down” and that it “emphasizes criminal enforcement.”) (emphasis in
original).
182. Holmer, supra note 12, at 2.
183. Id.
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CVE it is still, at its core, a security discourse and policy framework
in which human rights play a secondary and enabling role.184 It is also
a framework that in many contexts has had a disproportionate focus
and discriminatory impact on Muslim communities with distinct
gender and human rights consequences that I explore further below.185
This securitization of women’s human rights concerns is closely
accompanied by another, second normative feature of women’s rights
in the post-9/11 era: the risk of instrumentalization186 and narrowing
of opportunities to develop and implement gender norms, as well as
the prospects for inclusive feminist approaches. Such instrumental
approaches to international law protections—meaning those that
approach gender norms and women’s rights primarily, or even solely,
through a lens of countering terrorism or countering violent
extremism—can undoubtedly be seductive,187 having particular
salience for those feminist approaches that feared marginalization and
irrelevancy in the immediate aftermath of the events of 9/11. On one
level, it is indeed easy to see the appeal in this approach; as well as
being a tool for keeping women’s rights in the spotlight, it is also true,
for example, in practice, that many instances of gender equality
organizing and advocacy by women’s rights organizations and human
rights defenders—including those working on women, peace, and
security issues—do contribute upstream to creating the kind of
resilient, tolerant, and peaceful societies to which contemporary
national security policy and practice aspire. It may also be the case—
as per the instrumentalist position—that gender equality has a net
positive effect in countering terrorism and violent extremism.188
However, it should be noted that strong empirical work on the latter is
184. See generally Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 834 (2015) (analyzing the coercive aspects of the US government’s community
engagement strategy pursuant to its CVE program). A helpful parallel might also be drawn
here with an observation made in some feminist approaches to security studies that efforts to
integrate “human security” into policy-making in practice “do little to change the traditional
security narrative” including because human security “focuses on incremental reform of the
existing system”: see WIBBEN, supra note 176, at 84, 85.
185. See infra note 192 and accompanying text; see also Aziz, supra note 80, at 214.
186. See, e.g., Jayne Huckerby, The Complexities of Women, Peace, Security and
Countering Violent Extremism, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 24, 2015); PREVENTING CONFLICT,
TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra note 61, at 227-31; Tripp, supra note
13, at 12-13 (noting that the incorporation of women into State-based national security
strategies risks their being used instrumentally to promote counter-terrorism efforts).
187. Feminism as Counter-Terrorism, supra note 4; Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1116.
188. See generally Ehrenreich, supra note 166; Terror/Torture, supra note 109, at 49.

2016]

FEMINISM IN THE POST-9/11 ERA

581

lacking, and ultimately irrelevant in principle if the promotion of
international norms on gender equality is seen as an end in and of
itself rather than a means to the end of countering terrorism and
violent extremism.
However, despite these appeals, the trend toward securitization
and instrumentalization of women’s human rights has, to date, been
both normatively damaging and disruptive of opportunities for
effective organizing for women’s rights. In particular, making
women’s rights of secondary importance in a broader counterterrorism or countering violent extremism agenda opens up the
possibility of bartering down or away women’s rights and gender
equality when such bartering is perceived to serve national security
interests—a pattern that already has occurred in some existing
countering terrorism and violent extremism practice and which
undermines the inviolability of women’s rights protections.189 The
risks to the legitimacy and viability of women’s human rights
advocacy are also acute. For example, women’s rights advocacy that
becomes “too closely associated” with Western national security
agendas increases the threat of backlash against women’s rights
defenders or others seeking to implement gender equality norms. 190
In addition, framing women’s rights and advocacy as a strategic
element of national security policy, also means that security actors—
including in many cases discriminatory, undemocratic, and
unreformed security services—become the key interlocutors on the
implementation of women’s human rights, almost inevitably to their
detriment.191 In many cases, such securitized engagement on issues of
women’s rights takes place in already racially, ethnically, and
religiously marginalized communities, including those that have been
previously targeted and adversely affected by counter-terrorism
policies. Lessons from programs such as those in the United Kingdom
189. See U.N. Doc. A/64/211, supra note 93, at ¶ 36; Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 30 on Women in Conflict
Prevention, Conflict and Post-conflict Situations, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30 ¶ 17 (Oct. 18,
2013) (recommending that States parties “(b) Reject all forms of rollbacks in women’s rights
protections in order to appease non-State actors such as terrorists, private individuals or armed
groups”); A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra note 7,
at 28, 207–08.
190. See PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE,
supra note 61, at 222; A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM,
supra note 7, at 26.
191. See, e.g., Jayne Huckerby, Open Briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on
The Role of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism (Sept. 9, 2015).
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where broad CVE programing sought to explicitly promote the
engagement of Muslim women indicate that such programing
increases alienation, discrimination, and harassment against Muslim
women and creates a concern that the perspectives of minority women
are only valued as they relate to the achievement of national security
objectives.192 The rejection of such instrumentalized and securitized
approaches—including through insisting on clarity on the dividing
line between women’s rights and women, peace, and security, issues
on the one hand, and countering violent extremism and terrorism, on
the other—is a core challenge for feminist approaches to international
law moving forward.193
Additionally, efforts to conjoin women’s rights and national
security, particularly under more holistic approaches that still
nonetheless retain an overarching security orientation, have also
sometimes led to a preference for norms outside of binding human
rights treaty law—e.g., in UN Security Council Resolutions (on
women, peace, and security) or transnational criminal law (e.g., the
UN Trafficking Protocol)—as the preferred vanguard for women’s
rights protections. In part, this turn away from the binding framework
of international human rights law can be traced to an early distrust in
a number of feminist accounts of the role of hard legal protections for
ensuring gender equality. Such feminist accounts of international law
scrutinized hard and soft law human rights guarantees, canvassing
gender-neutral law for its gendered character and impacts,194 as well
192. See, e.g., Gender, Counter-Terrorism and International Law, supra note 8; WOMEN
AND PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: THE U.S. AND U.K. EXPERIENCES, supra note 14;
PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra note 61, at
222.
193. See generally Huckerby, supra note 186; PREVENTING CONFLICT, TRANSFORMING
JUSTICE, SECURING THE PEACE, supra note 61, at 227-31 (recommending that governments
should “[d]etach programming on women’s rights from counter-terrorism and extremism, and
all military planning and military processes” and to “[p]rotect women’s and girls’ rights at all
times and ensure that efforts to counter violent extremism strategies do not stereotype,
instrumentalize or securitize women and girls”); Good Practices on Women and Countering
Violent Extremism, supra note 53, at 1 (“The human rights of women and girls . . . should be
promoted and protected at all times and not just as a means for CVE.”).
194. See Brooks, supra note 16, at 350–52 (analyzing the problematic assumption of
international human rights law, including as embodied in CEDAW, that “‘maleness’ is the
norm, and progress in gender equity will come only when women are treated ‘the same’ as
men”); Feminist Methods in International Law, supra note 16, at 386 (noting that “the
definition of human rights is limited and androcentric”); Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist
Ambivalence About International Law, 11 INT’L LEG. THEORY 1, 5–6 (2005) (“Perhaps more
than in any other area of international law, states have crafted many techniques to avoid
implementing international norms relating to women in national legal systems. These
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as querying the benefits of siloing women’s rights into specialized
instruments and institutions, including through a hard law, but highlyreserved and weak international human rights treaty in the form of the
UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women.195 This feminist wariness of the importance of hard
law human rights protections in ensuring women’s rights was
consolidated by the secondary role accorded to human rights in the
post-9/11 era: evidenced both in the initial (and in many cases
ongoing) challenges in getting States to observe human rights in
countering terrorism and violent extremism (e.g., in detention
practices), but also in the development of more instrumental
approaches to human rights in “soft” countering terrorism and violent
extremism approaches that have a tendency to emphasize human
rights as a strategic tool rather than hard obligation. As such, efforts
to conjoin gender issues and national security tend to emphasize the
intelligence or security value of women’s inclusion and gender
mainstreaming over those formal legal norms (e.g., nondiscrimination and gender equality) which arguably constitute binding
treaty obligations for the same outcomes.196 These factors, along with
the invisibility of States’ violations of women’s human rights in the
name of countering terrorism described above, are both symptomatic
techniques include extensive reservation toward CEDAW and the invocation of notions of
‘local culture’ as a reason not to accept the principle of women’s equality with men.”);
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Gendering the Declaration, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 335, 335 (2009)
(identifying examples of gender “exclusions” embodied in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights). See generally Rebecca J. Cook, Women’s International Human Rights Law:
The Way Forward, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 230, 261 (1993); Karen Engle, International Human
Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 517 (1992).
195. Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 632–34; Not Waving
but Drowning, supra note 123, at 1. Such feminist critiques of international human rights also
queried the extent to “which the acquisition of legal rights advances women’s equality,” in the
face of massive inequality and discrimination in practice, as well as a series of inherent biases
within the international human rights system that ultimately undermined even those formal
legal gains in women’s rights. See Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 16,
at 634; Stark, supra note 28, at 699–700. As such, these accounts also identified and faulted a
series of gendered asymmetries within the international human rights system that operate to
the detriment of women’s substantive rights enjoyment; an example often given is
international human rights law’s traditional preference for civil and political rights over
economic, social, and cultural rights, where the latter can have particular resonance for
women. See Feminist Approaches to International Law, supra note 16, at 635. Still other
asymmetries result from perceived conflicts between women’s rights and other human rights
guarantees, e.g., the right to freedom of religion, which are often resolved in favor of the
competing right of which the primary beneficiaries are often men. See id. at 635–38.
196. See supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text.
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and generative of this decreased attention to the role of hard law
obligations in protecting women’s rights.
D. Feminist Methods and Fractured Feminisms
While the above sections primarily address the normative
impacts of the post-9/11 environment on gender equality and
women’s rights, it is also important to make some further
observations about how that environment has affected the possibilities
for transnational and inclusive feminist organizing, as well as other
feminist methods in international law. What stands out in a review of
this environment is the extent to which there is no single “global
feminist” or “global feminism” that dominates. While women have
been notably absent, if not invisible,197 in the trajectory of national
security policy-making and practice from 9/11 to the present, some
feminisms—‟international
conflict
feminism,”
abolitionists
capitalizing on the trafficking-terror nexus, those opposing “Muslim
fundamentalism,” and to some extent those perspectives advancing
feminist analyses of women’s engagement in terrorism and violent
extremism—have had airtime in certain instances and at certain
junctures. However, to the extent that there has been an involvement
of such feminisms, it would be very difficult to describe the
organizational style as “coalitional” or uniform, or evincing an
identifiable representational practice—another core feature of
“governance feminism”198—stemming as each does from quite
different foci and entry points in the terrain of contemporary national
security practice and policy. Instead, explanations for both the
engagement and resonance of these perspectives range from the
intrinsic (e.g., a genuine concern about the real impacts of terrorism
on women and girls) to the instrumental (e.g., as a strategy of some
feminist voices concerned about the inattention to women’s rights in
an era dominated by national security actors and seeking a hook to
ensure women’s issues remain on the agenda in the altered policymaking space)—or in some cases, a mixture of the two. These
perspectives also often mobilize opposite or competing gendered
197. See, e.g., Ní Aoláin, supra note 4, at 1086.
198. See, e.g., Rape at Rome, supra note 2, at 3 (identifying feminists’ organizational
style in support of the development of the international criminal tribunals during the course of
the 1990s as “coalitional”); see also id. at 6 (“Feminism working on sexual violence in IHL
and ICL in the 1990s, especially the part of it that worked on the big tribunal-establishing
statutes, was nearly consolidated in its feminist ideology and in its goals.”).
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images. For example, for feminists combating “Muslim
fundamentalism,” a key emphasis has been on portraying terrorism as
the antithesis of gender equality and, often, stressing the status of
women as victims.199 Such approaches dovetail neatly with
governments’ emphasis on the idea of women’s vulnerability and lack
of agency as a justification for counter-terrorism, particularly on
behalf of women in the Global South. However, at the same time,
other perspectives—particularly those analyzing the complex array of
motivations of women for joining or supporting terrorist and violent
extremist organizations—can emphasize women’s agency, as well as
the various roles women play in terrorist organizations. An additional
layer that complicates a portrait of feminist homogeneity is that often,
as discussed above, the impetus for women’s inclusion and gender
mainstreaming has come from national security actors, particularly in
the context of contemporary security practice.200 This move without
more is suggestive more of “cooption” than “governance
feminism.”201
In addition to differing perspectives amongst these feminisms,
there has also been a notable absence of a number of key feminists
and feminism engaging in either the formation or critique of evolving
practices in countering terrorism and violent extremism from a legal
perspective, particularly after the initial crisis moment represented by
the events of 9/11. For some this absence derives from an unease of
how the feminist project could be used or co-opted to support military
or more broadly coercive actions.202 In practice, however, the absence
of a number of feminist voices from national security discourse and
practice can also in part be attributed to a perceived lack of relevant
expertise on the topic, particularly when counter-terrorism and
countering violent extremism was dominated by “hard” security
measures such as military, law enforcement, and intelligence action.
The notion of installing feminism as authority which features
prominently in the “governance feminism” literature—the idea that a
199. See, e.g., Remembering the Other’s Others, supra note 101; Terror/Torture, supra
note 109; supra note 108 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 72, 82, and 162 and accompanying text.
201. The Exile of Inclusion, supra note 174, at 13 (“[I]nstitutional reception and
management of feminist ideas works to divest them of their emancipatory content, and
therefore prefer to depict the result as ‘cooption’ rather than ‘governance feminism’, which
implies the result is intentional.”).
202. For examples of this unease, see Kapur, supra note 7; Feminism as CounterTerrorism, supra note 4; supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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key methodology and entry point of feminism has been the
elaboration of feminism as expertise—simply does not find a parallel
in the post-9/11 legal and institutional landscape. The result has been
an array of normative silences in areas that the gaze of feminism
would have otherwise surfaced. For example, unlike the achievement
of “governance feminism,” in ensuring international humanitarian law
and international criminal law explicitly addressed the “distinctive
harms that women suffer in armed conflict,”203 feminist approaches—
with few exceptions—have been woefully late and inadequate in
raising the visibility of the gendered effects of State’s counterterrorism measures.204
Additionally, a number of other features of the post-9/11
environment have fractured the opportunities for transnational and
inclusive feminist organizing, particularly by reinforcing—and in
some case creating—hierarchies among different women and
women’s organizations. In large part, these hierarchies derive from
the idea of feminism-as-counter-terrorism. The argument that gender
equality should be deployed as a counter-terrorism tool is at its core
about Western governments seeking to shore up their own domestic
security by promoting women’s rights not so much within their own
territories, but instead, within other States’ domestic jurisdictions.
Under this approach, the domestic prerogatives of one State are used
to throw open the “black box”205 of another’s domestic affairs to
scrutinize deeply local contexts and to assess the potential roles that
foreign women can play in combating violent extremism. It is within
this framework, for example, that local women’s organizing on
confronting oppressive policies within the context of religion,206
begins to be viewed less as an organic, localized, human rights effort
and more as a potential part of a broader and structured counterterrorism policy to increase the security of the Global North. Such an
approach reinforces hierarchies amongst women’s rights, because it
implies that the human rights of foreign women—including
immigrant women in the West—only matter to the extent that they

203. Rape at Rome, supra note 2, at 123.
204. See supra notes 107–12 and accompanying text.
205. See Brooks, supra note 16, at 348.
206. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003) (identifying
ways in which local Muslim women activists are challenging oppressive laws and practices
and pursuing equality within the framework of religion).
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can be of service to ensuring the security of majority women in
Western countries.207
Compounding this splintering are other features of counterterrorism practice, in particular anti-terrorism financing rules, which
have reinforced “top down” approaches to feminist advocacy in the
post-9/11 era. In particular, counter-terrorism financing rules have
narrowed the operating space and resources available for small, local
women’s organizations: such rules, by their nature are genderdiscriminatory and in practice, cut off funding women’s
organizations.208 In this environment, donors also increasingly prefer
to “channel funds via large organizations (including consultancies)”
meaning that “direct access to funding is getting more difficult for
women’s organizations.”209 In still other cases, the politicization of
counter-terrorism discourse and practice can mean that those smaller
women’s organizations that are eligible to receive such grants may
reject the terms of the grant (such as those requiring extensive due
diligence on partners) as a matter of principle.210 In addition to having
to work through bigger organizations, counter-terrorism measures
have meant that women’s organizations are also often forced to
engage in an array of adaptive behavior that places great strain on
their work, including by “[k]eeping a low profile in regards to certain
activities, or dropping of some programs.”211 Against a backdrop of
these changes that have been wrought by the national security
landscape in the long shadow of 9/11, certain feminist methods
designed to take into account women’s diverse experiences (e.g.,
“world traveling,” that requires “multicultural dialogue and a shared

207. See generally Cyra Akila Choudhury, Empowerment or Estrangement?: Liberal
Feminism’s Visions of the “Progress” of Muslim Women, 39 U. BALTIMORE. L. Forum 153,
153 (2009) (“The last decade and a half has seen a burgeoning of transnational activism on
behalf of women in the global South. With the continuing wars on terror and in Iraq, Muslim
women’s oppression and the role of Islam in that oppression remain in the limelight.”). These
patterns can reinforce already existing hierarchies amongst women. See, e.g., Stark, supra note
28, at 729 (citations omitted) (arguing that the “fragmentation of women’s human rights law”
has been a “real boon for educated, middle-class women” and for those in the “global North”).
208. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
209. Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the Implementation of the Women,
Peace and Security Agenda, supra note 134, at 6.
210. See A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM, supra
note 7, at 75.
211. Counterterrorism Measures and Their Effects on the Implementation of the Women,
Peace and Security Agenda, supra note 134, at 7.
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search for areas of overlap, shared concerns and values”212) simply
falter, and the “spread of feminist ideas” shuts down rather than
facilitates “new spaces for feminist activism.”213
CONCLUSION: FEMINISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
NATIONAL SECURITY MOVING FORWARD
Terrorism, as well as counter-terrorism and countering violent
extremism, are dominant features of the global landscape in the post9/11 era. While there have been some feminist legal analyses of
States’ national security responses, these tend to primarily address
9/11 and its immediate aftermath, including the conflicts of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and have neither taken a long view on the
aftermath of 9/11 nor kept apace with the more holistic approaches to
countering terrorism and violent extremism that represent
contemporary national security practice. Instead, the praxis with
which almost all feminist international law accounts of national
security have been concerned is the initial landscape of counterterrorism in the aftermath of 9/11, comprising “hard,” post hoc
military, law enforcement, and intelligence approaches addressed to
the pursuit and apprehension of terrorists that privileged traditional
and coercive security actions and actors. Contemporary national
security practices that consist of more holistic and “soft” preventive
measures that target the pre-criminal space and address conditions
conducive to terrorism such as the dehumanization of victims, as well
as the promotion of human rights—particularly through a new field of
policy and activities known as countering violent extremism—have
hitherto escaped feminist scrutiny. While the events of 9/11 and the
immediate response were core antecedents for these contemporary
practices, there are significant developments in the fields of
countering terrorism and violent extremism of which there is
insufficient account, particularly vis-à-vis its impact on the

212. See Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Traveling, and MultiCultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
189, 191 (1992). See generally Feminist Methods in International Law, supra note 16, at 383–
85; Karen Engle, Female Subjects of International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic Other
Female, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509 (1992); Nancy Kim, Toward A Feminist Theory of
Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism,
25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49 (1993).
213. The Exile of Inclusion, supra note 174, at 14.
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development and implementation of international law on gender
equality.
The failure to attend to the impact of this broad and evolving
national security environment on the capacity of international law and
its institutions to address gender equality has been consequential. It
has not meant that concepts of gender equality and feminism have not
been considered within this evolving context, but rather that where
they have been taken up it is in ways that favor certain feminist
perspectives—‟international conflict feminism,” abolitionists
capitalizing on the trafficking-terror nexus, those opposing “Muslim
fundamentalism,” and to some extent those perspectives advancing
feminist analyses of women’s engagement in violent extremism—and
not others, with consequences that are not always favorable to
women’s rights. From heavy investments in gendered notions of
women as victims of terrorism to the promotion of women’s
participation in national security in ways that deploy a series of
troubling gender stereotypes to the securitization and
instrumentalization of gender equality itself as a counter-terrorism
measure, the prospects for progressive feminist approaches to
international law have been markedly narrowed. Compounding these
effects that have flowed from national security’s uptake of women
and gender equality are other normative consequences of this
evolving and broadened national security landscape, including how a
post-9/11 revival of international law’s formalism has reduced the
discipline’s capacity to develop gender equality norms and to address
State-based violations against women, while at the same time
inculcating a steady preference for soft rather than hard, treaty law
protections for women’s rights. Against this backdrop and in the
current grey area that exists between “governance feminism” and
feminism governed, the need for transnational and genuinely
inclusive feminist organizing is particularly acute. At the same time,
however, several features of the post-9/11 era—particularly the
gender-discriminatory impacts of counter-terrorism financing rules—
mitigate against such approaches. As such, this Article seeks to
provide a starting point to inform an ongoing examination of
feminism and international law in the post-9/11 era in ways that fully
contemplate the future normative and political capacity of
international law and international institutions to address gender
equality.

590

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:533

With regard to developing that framework moving forward, this
Article’s examination of contemporary national security policy and
practice demonstrates that the task of seeing women, and more
broadly gender, reveals itself to be a much more complicated
undertaking than only looking at women as victims of male terrorist
violence or lamenting their absence in security decision-making.
Instead, a feminist project or projects that seek to make gender
concerns visible in the current national security context must consider
at least four separate aspects as well as how each of these areas relate
to each other: the human rights and gender issues at stake in women’s
engagement in and support of terrorism; the impact of terrorism and
violent extremism on women and girls and gender equality; the roles
of women and gender equality in countering terrorism and violent
extremism, including through women’s participation in security
institutions; and the impact of counter-terrorism and countering
violent extremism on women and girls. The last fourteen years in
particular have been beset by feminist failures to authentically address
these and other intersections of women’s rights issues with terrorism
and efforts at fighting its occurrence. These failures range from the
continued impunity for terrorists who directly and differently target
women and girls’ security in conflict and post-conflict settings to
failure to adopt gender-sensitive disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programs for females involved in terrorism and violent
extremism to gender-based abuses in the name of national security
that frustrate the full implementation of the gender equality agenda.
In addressing such effects moving forward, it will be as
important not to overstate how much countering violent extremism
and terrorism is of concern to the women, peace, and security agenda
and gender equality, and vice versa, as it will be to not downplay the
overlaps. From insisting on clarity on the dividing line between the
fields of countering violent extremism and women’s rights advocacy
to developing gender-sensitive prevention and response frameworks
without unduly trading in images of women’s vulnerability and
victimhood, feminist approaches to international law in the post-9/11
era face a pressing challenge not just of ensuring women’s rights are
protected from incursion by either terrorists or State actors, but that
women and the gender equality agenda more broadly are not squeezed
between terror and counter-terror.

